

Social Identity and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy: Evidence from a Youth Survey in Turkey

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the relationship between social identity based on national, religious, or international affiliations and attitudes toward foreign policy in the Turkish context. Evidence is drawn from an original survey conducted among university students in Turkey. The results show that students' social identity has a significant correlation with their perceptions of foreign policy. Most Turkish university students provide conditional support for the new directions in Turkey's foreign policy, but those with an Islamic identity appear to be more supportive of the AKP's policies. Most university students believe that Turkey's future lies in the European Union and the Central Asian Turkic republics rather than in the Middle East. Overall, the perceptions of educated youth toward foreign policy are shaped by both social identity and their conceptions of national interest.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was given a hero's welcome in Turkey after he stormed out of a meeting during a heated debate with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres at the Davos Economic forum in 2009. The event, known as the "one-minute crisis," was a reflection of Turkey's foreign policy activism in the new millennium.¹ This activism is usually attributed to the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, the Justice and Development Party) and its chief foreign policy strategist Ahmet Davutoğlu, who became the foreign minister in 2009.

The new activism in foreign policy is most visible in the government's approach toward Middle Eastern countries. The Islamic credentials of the AKP leadership combined with the country's increasing orientation toward this region have led some students of Turkish politics to talk of the "Middle Easternization" of foreign policy² or of a profound shift "enacting neo-Ottomanism,"³ although others have argued that Turkey's foreign policy continues to be oriented

mainly toward the West.⁴ One line of criticism of the AKP's foreign policy builds on the argument that a trend of Islamization is taking place in Turkish society and that this is causing a shift from the West to the East in foreign policy orientation. According to some observers, the AKP is pursuing this shift in order to appeal to a religiously conservative and nationalistic constituency and thereby enhance its electoral fortunes.⁵ Some scholars explain the new foreign policy activism as reflecting a broader trend toward the "democratization of foreign policy"⁶ and other developments in domestic politics.⁷ These explanations are connected to a widespread perception that public opinion has become highly significant in Turkish foreign policy decisions.

In this article, which focuses on the preferences of domestic actors as one factor in Turkey's recent foreign policy shifts, I examine individual perceptions to test whether and how social identity informs attitudes about foreign policy. The paper inquires into social identities based on national, religious, ethnic, or international affiliations and their relation to individuals' opinions about foreign affairs. The focus of the research was on the attitudes of university students, an important segment of the Turkish society. The analysis that follows draws on the results of an original survey I conducted among 800 university students in Turkey.

Studying students' attitudes toward foreign policy is important for several reasons. First, past research on the relationships between public opinion, identity, and foreign policy in Turkey has been largely theoretical.⁸ Empirical research dealing with these relationships is likely to enhance our understanding of them. Second, despite a widespread perception that public opinion plays an increasingly important role in Turkish foreign policy, previous studies have generally neglected the micro-level foundations of foreign policy and have examined systemic and state-level factors.⁹ Finally, the political attitudes of youth are not addressed adequately in Middle East

studies more broadly.¹⁰ The significant role of educated young people in the Arab Spring suggests that the politics of youth will continue to play an important role in the Middle East.

In the next section, I provide a brief survey of scholarly research on the recent transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Then, I explore some theoretical insights about the increasing salience of public opinion and social identity in Turkey in shaping foreign policy. After developing a conceptual framework based on the notion of multiple identities, I argue that social identity may be constructed in relation to either the national context or the international environment.¹¹ For example, ethnic, religious, or national identities may exemplify the former and regional or global attachments the latter. The distinction between nationally and internationally situated identities is utilized to evaluate the findings from the survey. In the results section, I report students' general perceptions of international affairs and present the cross-tabulation of the data on the relationship between social identity and foreign policy orientations in Turkey.

A NEW FOREIGN POLICY ACTIVISM: THE AKP ERA

During the Cold War, Turkey's major foreign policy occupation was dealing with the Soviet threat. The government's alliance with the West and particularly its NATO membership provided security against the Soviets while distancing the country from Middle Eastern and other neighbors. Despite moments of crisis,¹² Turkey's relations with the major powers turned it into a Western "status quo power par excellence" and Turkey's foreign policy during the Cold War is best "characterized as tactical, defensive, and unimaginative."¹³

By the end of the Cold War, Turkey was already in search of a new role in an increasingly globalized world order. Throughout the 1980s, Prime Minister Turgut Özal's

neoliberal economic policies began to move the country from import substitution to an export-oriented economy.¹⁴ In the early 1990s, the government attempted to gain influence in Central Asia and the Balkans with no tangible success. In the same period, the increasingly violent struggle with the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and perceived threats from neighbors such as Greece and Syria led to a new security paradigm steered by the military establishment. These external and internal threats produced a feeling of insecurity, which in turn drove the increased use of hard power against the PKK, leading some observers to define Turkey as a "post-cold war warrior."¹⁵ Meanwhile, the military-bureaucratic establishment chose to capitalize on a strategic partnership with Israel during a time of slow progress in Turkey's application for European Union (EU) accession. Turkey was in search of a new direction in its foreign policy strategies and according to some observers was "muddling through" the 1990s.¹⁶

The rise of the AKP to power in 2002 marked the beginning of a new era, though the party's foreign policies were not a complete rupture with the past.¹⁷ The shift was first observed during Özal's presidency in 1991-93; examples include Turkey's increasing diplomatic and economic activities in Central Asia, the rhetoric of "From the Adriatic to the Great China Wall," and the government's support for U.S. policies during the first Gulf War.¹⁸ Later, amid the economic and political turmoil of early 2000, the foreign minister of the coalition government, Ismail Cem, initiated a multidimensional foreign policy strategy that aimed to strengthen relations with Turkey's neighbors beyond the EU. This trend continued with the AKP's rise to power.

Ziya Öniş and ŞuhnazYılmaz argue that Turkish foreign policy activism since the end of the Cold War can be separated into three periods: a western-oriented proactive policy in the years immediately following the Cold War; an early period of AKP activism characterized by

Europeanization (2002-2007); and a later AKP period of loose Europeanization and soft Euro-Asianism (2007 to the present).¹⁹ The last of these periods has drawn considerable scholarly and political attention because it increased Turkey's involvement in the Middle East, leading some observers to conclude that the country was shifting its axis by Middle Easternizing and/or Islamizing its foreign policy orientation, a shift that some have framed as "neo-Ottomanism."²⁰ This does not necessarily imply a total break with the West. For example, Tarık Oğuzlu, citing Ahmet Davutoğlu, asserts that "Turkey is increasingly capitalizing on its Eastern identity with a view to securing its place within the West."²¹ Larrabee similarly rejects the claim that Turkey's recent activism is an attempt to turn its back on the West, arguing instead that it is a rational strategic attempt to adapt to a changing international environment.²² In a similar vein, Henri Barkey states that "for all the appearance of conflict with the West, the fact of the matter is the AKP leadership was careful not to veer too far off from established consensus. There was never talk of abandoning any of the Western institutions Turkey belonged to."²³

Geopolitical concerns, new economic policies, and changes in the world system are frequently invoked as the main frameworks for the AKP's foreign policy shifts.²⁴ Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu influenced the AKP's foreign policy decisions as a chief advisor until 2009, when he was appointed foreign minister, and his doctrine of "strategic depth" has been implemented as Turkey's foreign policy orientation.²⁵ Corresponding to the weight assigned to the Middle East by Davutoğlu, the AKP's foreign policy strategies are most visible in this region.²⁶ According to his doctrine foreign policy in the new world order should be understood not as a set of bilateral relations but rather as a series of reinforcing and interlocking processes. Davutoğlu believes that in developing a long-term foreign policy strategy, policymakers need to consider the "historical depth" and "geographical depth" of their country. The former consists of

the links between the country's past, present, and future and the latter of the complex relations between domestic, regional, and global actors. Davutoğlu's notion of strategic depth encompassing a country's geocultural, geoeconomic, and geopolitical roles can be understood by looking at the intersection of these two components. In this model, Turkey is considered to be a central country located in the Afro-Eurasian landmass with a significant heritage of Islamic culture and Ottoman history. With these unique geopolitical and cultural features, Turkey carries multiple regional identities that make it European, Middle Eastern, Asian, Mediterranean, Islamic, and Western at the same time. Based on this theoretical model, Davutoğlu argues that Turkey should maintain its traditional Western orientation with a strong Eurasian and Middle Eastern component.²⁷

Turkey's image in the Middle East has changed significantly since 1997, when Turkish president Süleyman Demirel had to leave a meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization early because of protests against Turkey's alliance with Israel. At the same conference in 2003, Abdullah Gül received welcome remarks by the members of this organization as the foreign minister of the most modernized democratic Muslim country.²⁸ While this advance came at the cost of deteriorating relations with Israel,²⁹ AKP's proactive foreign policy strategies paid off in policies toward Cyprus and Armenia and has helped Turkey to emerge as a regional power. It is within this international context that public opinion and social identity in Turkey has gained salience in shaping Turkish foreign policy.

PUBLIC OPINION AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

In his seminal work, James Rosenau defines six factors that influence a country's foreign policy: individual factors, role factors, governmental factors, societal factors, relational factors, and

systemic factors.³⁰ Students of Turkish politics have made invaluable contributions by exploring some of these factors to explain foreign policy choices in Turkey.³¹ In this section, I focus on the linkages between public opinion and international affairs.

The influence of domestic actors and public opinion on a government's foreign policy is well established by international relations scholars.³² For example, there is an extensive literature in the U.S. on how public debates have influenced the government decisions about the Vietnam War and U.S. involvement in the MiddleEast.³³ In contrast, there is a paucity of studies analyzing the relation between individual attitudes and international affairs in Turkey, even though numerous scholars have noted how Turkey's ongoing democratization process has increased the influence of domestic actors on foreign policy.

The nexus of domestic politics and international affairs in Turkey can be viewed in different ways. One plausible linkage between the two levels is the impact of the increasing weight of the international trade in the Turkish economy. Kemal Kirişçi employs an economic approach to explain the recent transformation in Turkish foreign policy.³⁴ He argues that the emergence of devout bourgeoisie, known as "Anatolian tigers,"³⁵ in electorally conservative provinces of Turkey and the related shift from a territorial state to a trading state has put economic considerations at the top of Turkey's foreign policy agenda. Under these conditions, he argues, business circles may exert a greater influence on the political elite than they did previously, helping to transform foreign policy strategies.³⁶ Kirişçi employs a multilevel approach that amalgamates individual, governmental, and societal factors in one model.³⁷

The increasing interactions between domestic and international politics is also highlighted by scholars who argue that the democratization of foreign policy has been a characteristic of the AKP era.³⁸ Ziya Öniş argues that "civil society involvement in foreign

policy initiatives became increasingly important and parallel to the democratization of foreign policy. Public opinion matters assume greater weight in shaping key foreign policy decisions.”³⁹ Meliha B. Altunisik believes that since 1980s, Turkey’s foreign policy has been transformed into a “contentious and pluralistic” area, involving inputs not only from the bureaucracy and political parties but also from think tanks and the broader public.⁴⁰ Similarly, Meltem Müftüler-Baç contends that EU-related reforms have improved democratization in Turkey, which in turn has opened avenues for previously excluded groups to be more vocal and assertive in formulating their foreign policy opinions.⁴¹

Whatever the causes, as the distinction between domestic and international politics declines, two important consequences follow. First, foreign policy becomes a contested issue to be exploited in domestic politics, either by economically motivated business circles who want to influence policymakers or by politicians who seek to increase their electoral fortunes by appealing to citizens. Second, and related, identity politics gains greater weight in the formulation of foreign policy, whether through pressure from the export-oriented Anatolian tigers affiliated with a religious, conservative, and nationalistic identity or from political leaders who are forced to pay more attention to the rising influence of new social groups.⁴²

Overall, as Turkey has made significant advances toward democratization in the new millennium, domestic politics have gained salience in foreign policy making. Domestic politics may influence foreign policy formulations through many different avenues, including political institutions, ideologies, electoral preferences, and economic structures. In the next section, I look at the role of social identities on foreign policy preferences and provide an empirical assessment by analyzing the attitudes of the university students in Turkey.

SOCIAL IDENTITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY

Oğuzlu argues that the “Middle Easternization” of foreign policy may partly be attributed to the increasing importance of Islamic identity in Turkey.⁴³ Other observers agree that there has been an identity shift in Turkey and that AKP leaders have been using foreign policy to gain leverage with the electorate.⁴⁴ This argument builds on the notion of audience costs that force the AKP leadership to take into account the preferences of a nationalistic and religious constituency when making foreign policy choices. As evidence for this proposition, scholars frequently point to an influential study suggesting that a rising tide of religiosity and conservatism has recently been observed in Turkish politics.⁴⁵

Kardaş frames the connection between the AKP’s foreign policies and religious-conservative ideology in a different way. He states that “The AKP’s reference to public ‘demand’ in many cases has an instrumental value allowing it to justify its foreign policy domestically and deflect criticism from outside.”⁴⁶ Aydın, too, disputes the primary role of Islamic considerations in determining the AKP’s foreign policy preferences and asserts that they are more likely to be used as a “cover.”⁴⁷ These studies do not discredit the role of identity-based and societal explanations for the recent shifts in Turkish foreign policy; rather, they argue that this impact is utilized in an electorally pragmatic manner by the AKP elite.

Whether social identity is used as a strategic cover or truly informs party strategies, it is one of the factors exerting an influence on foreign policy, yet its content and relation to international decision-making needs further study.⁴⁸ In addition, the distinction between identity, ideology, and political worldview is not always clear-cut. Altunışık argues that different ideas about foreign policy choices represent political worldviews about Turkey’s identity, interest, and

future and that the debates about foreign policy are “intertwined with domestic power struggles and identity politics in Turkey.”⁴⁹

The complex structure of identity, ideology, and political worldviews leaves scholars with an intricate web of relations shaping foreign policy choices. A person with a Muslim identity may have a liberal worldview and may support an active foreign policy toward the West rather than merely toward the Muslim world. A social-democratic and Western-oriented foreign minister may promote policies that generate proactive involvement in the Middle East as exemplified by Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem (1999-2002). Given the multifaceted nature of the relationship between foreign policy and citizens’ identity, ideology, and worldviews, it is imperative to study social identity as part of a complex social reality.

In foreign policy analysis, scholars have examined identity in two ways. Some researchers have employed the notion of state identity, defined as an overall orientation of a particular state, in a comparative⁵⁰ and Turkish foreign policy context.⁵¹ Other students of foreign policy have utilized the concept of identity as a microlevel trait.⁵² In what follows, I employ the latter approach, focusing on the relationship between social identity and perceptions of foreign policy.

Tajfel defines identity as “that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.”⁵³ According to this definition, identity is best understood as a relational concept that has formative effects on individual attitudes and preferences through a mechanism based on notions of *in-group* and *out-group*. Individuals are likely to view the world through lenses that are favorable for the group they are attached to and critical toward the group they perceive as the other.⁵⁴ Perceptions of in-group and out-group may

become even more salient in international relations than in domestic politics. Since international relations is defined as an anarchic environment where political units are in a constant search for security, individuals are likely to favor the nationhood they are attached to against other states that may be viewed as threats to their national existence. Thus, citizens of a state are likely to construct a national identity based on the perceptions of others residing outside their political territory.⁵⁵

There is a rich array of social identities in Turkey related to national, ethnic, and religious belongings. A Turkish citizen may feel affinity to categories such as Turk, Kurd, and Muslim, among others. These different layers of social identity may not be exclusive and individuals may hold multiple identities at local, national, and international levels.⁵⁶ Thoits and Virshup point to the existence of multiple overlapping identities and they differentiate between personal role-based identities, collective identities, and social category identities.⁵⁷ The Turkish case provides ample opportunities to examine such multiple and overlapping identities.

The following analysis makes a distinction between domestic and international forms of social identity. The former includes feelings about ethnic, national, and religious attachments. The latter is related to how individuals define themselves with respect to the regional and international position of their country. Given Turkey's unique position and the multiple state identities it holds, individuals may define themselves based on the country's geopolitical, geocultural, or geoeconomic position. An individual may define his/her international identity to be Middle Eastern, European, or both. These different layers and types of identity are likely to shape individual attitudes toward foreign policy. Individuals will hold positive attitudes toward policy initiatives about a region or people viewed as in-group. Conversely, they will have unfavorable views toward policy initiatives that are incompatible with their identity and the

perceptions of their in-group interests.⁵⁸ In addition to the in-group versus out-group dynamic, any form of identity may be coupled with a political worldview, ideology, or a domestic problem to inform individual choices.⁵⁹

SAMPLE AND DATA

To explore the relationship between social identities and perceptions of foreign policy, an original survey was conducted among the students of Cumhuriyet University in central Turkey.⁶⁰ University students constitute an important segment of the electorate, tend to act as opinion leaders, and are generally more active in political discussions compared to older generations and uneducated citizens.

The questionnaire was designed as a computer survey and was conducted in the computer labs of the university. This technique maximized the participation rate and a total of 800 students took the survey. A representative sample was obtained with respect to gender; 49 percent (392 students) of the respondents were male and 51 percent (408) female. Although more than half of the students were chosen from the College of Economics and Administrative Sciences (the college where surveys were administered), the rest of the students were picked on a voluntary basis from other colleges on the campus.⁶¹ The sample represents a balanced distribution of university levels and socioeconomic status; 42 percent of the students reported being in their first year, 14 percent in their second, 26 percent in their third, and 18 percent in their fourth or higher year of education. Among all participants, 26 percent reported coming from low-income, 14 percent from high-income, and the remaining 60 percent from middle-income families. The regional distribution of the survey respondents' origins was also balanced; according to the responses, the 800 students originated from 75 different provinces out of 81 in Turkey. Although

236 students (30%) are from the province where the campus is located, the rest of the sample is fairly evenly distributed across the regions.⁶²

Special care was taken to offset the limitations associated with the use of a single university campus. Campuses are political spaces where students are often engaged in political activities.⁶³ In the 1970s, leftist and nationalist students in Turkey utilized campuses as sites of peaceful and violent political demonstrations. Starting in the early 1990s Turkish campuses were divided over the headscarf controversy. Based on my conversations with colleagues and students during the field study, I believe this campus is not dominated by any political group. Furthermore, the selected sample demonstrates considerable variability in terms of students' political ideologies (see Table 1). The largest numbers identified as Social Democrat (15%), Democrat (17%), Nationalist (25%), and Conservative (11%). Some students reported stronger ideological positions, including Marxist (1%), Islamist (8%), and extreme nationalist (4%). Thus, I was able to obtain a highly representative sample that allows me to make generalizations about foreign policy orientations of university students in Turkey.

STUDENTS' PERCEPTION OF FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIES AND GOALS

First, I report results related to the students' general perceptions of foreign policy. The participants were asked whether the foreign policy strategy of the current government was on the right track, the wrong track, or neither. Of 800 respondents, 296 (37%) believe that the foreign policy is on the right track, 249 (31%) believe it is on the wrong track, and the remaining 255 (32%) take a neutral position. The educated youth do not appear to provide unconditional support for the AKP's foreign policy strategies.

One of the survey questions was: “In one word, how would you describe the identity of Turkey in foreign policy?” The students then were given a list of identity categories. Of 800 students, 47 percent described the country’s identity as “Turk,” 22 percent as “Muslim,” and 11 percent as “Ottoman.” Those who believe that Turkey’s state identity is “Western” or “European” add up to 11 percent and the remaining 9 percent think of Turkey as “Middle Eastern.” These results show that about half of the university students view Turkey through nationalistic lenses. Those who view Turkey’s state identity as Western or Middle Eastern constitute a small minority. Thus, in accordance with the findings of past studies,⁶⁴ state identity is perceived through a political-territorial lens rather than through regional, religious, or historical frameworks.

The survey also included an item tapping into the respondents’ views of Turkey’s role and goals in neighboring regions where Turkey pursues an active foreign policy. The respondents were asked to specify whether they strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or are neutral about some statements (see Figure 1). For each statement, positive responses (strongly agree and agree) and negative responses (strongly disagree and disagree) are combined. As Figure 1 demonstrates, a very high percentage of the respondents (73%) believe that Turkey should be a leader in the Middle East, followed by 61 percent who support a leadership goal in the Balkans. One can argue that Turkey’s historical legacy may be leading educated youth to favor an ambitious goal in the Middle East and the Balkans, both former Ottoman territories. Since about half of the students think that Turkey’s state identity is “Turk,” it may not be surprising that 57 percent agree with the idea of political integration with the Central Asian Turkic republics. More than half of the students (54%) agree that Turkey should be the leader of the Muslim world, yet 28 percent of the respondents disagree with this goal.

Interestingly, support for EU membership is only 45 percent; 29 percent of the students oppose EU membership. When the goals of Turkish foreign policy and Turkey's leadership role in international affairs are considered, the young and educated segment of Turkish society gives more weight to nationalistic, historical (i.e. Ottoman), and religious affinities. It seems that educated youth value increased involvement in the Middle East, the Turkic republics, and the Muslim world, and that a majority believes that Turkey's state identity should be defined in nationalist terms. So, what is behind these preferences about foreign policy? Do different types of identity shape attitudes about foreign policy among university students? In the next section, I try to answer these questions by reporting the results of the survey questions related to individual identity and attitudes toward foreign policy.

IDENTITY AND PERCEPTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY

The survey included some items measuring social identity at the national and international levels. Among many questions tapping respondents' attachments, the following two were selected for empirical analysis.⁶⁵

Which one of the following describes you best?

Muslim	Both Muslim and Turk
First Muslim then Turk	Both Muslim and Kurd
First Muslim then Kurd	Turk
First Turk then Muslim	Kurd
First Kurd then Muslim	Other

Which one of the following describes you best?

European

Middle Eastern

Global Citizen

Both European and Middle Eastern

The first item measures social identity in a domestic/national context while the second asks about the respondents' orientations with respect to regional and international attachments. Therefore the first item is named a "national" identity in the results while the second item is labeled an "international" identity (see Table 2).

Table 2 shows that on the first question, related to the national context, 81 percent of respondents describe their social identity as a combination of religious and ethnic attachments. Among all participants, 39 percent report the best description of their identity as "both a Turk and Muslim" and 3 percent report "both a Kurd and Muslim." Similarly, 28 percent of the respondents identify as "Muslim first and then Turk," 2 percent as "Muslim first and then a Kurd," and finally 7.5 percent chose "first a Turk/Kurd and then a Muslim" (7% Turk and 0.5% Kurd) as their primary attachment. While multiple overlapping identities appear to be the norm, nationalist and religious social identities are dominant among university students. Those who define themselves solely by ethnic or religious identity are only 15.5 percent of all participants (8% Muslim, 7% Turk, and 0.5% Kurd). On the second question, considering attachments in an international context, the largest group is formed by those who describe themselves as "global citizens," while 33 percent of the educated youth feel that they are both European and Middle

Eastern. A larger number of respondents stated that their international identity is only Middle Eastern (21%) than only European (12%). Overall, the distribution of students across these two dimensions shows a good degree of variance.⁶⁶

Given respondents' self-reported identity, what are their foreign policy preferences? Do they support the AKP's foreign policy vision? Where do they see Turkey's future? What are their preferences in relation to Turkish foreign policy? Figure 2 shows the two-way distribution of students' identity (national and international) and their beliefs about their government's foreign policy strategy. The bars show the percentage of respondents who believe that Turkey's foreign policy is on the right track, wrong track, or neither (see Figure 2). The responses demonstrate that domestic social identities powerfully inform preferences toward foreign policy. In particular, Islamic identity, whether on its own or in conjunction with ethnic/national identity is a strong predictor of support for the AKP's foreign policy choices. Overall, 37 percent of the students support the current government's foreign policy. More specifically, as the right panel of the graph demonstrates, 60 percent of those who describe their identity solely with reference to Islam support the AKP's foreign policy. A pattern of strong support is similarly observed among those who define themselves as first Muslim and then Turk (43%), first Muslim and then Kurd (53%), both Muslim and Turk (34%), and both Muslim and Kurd (65%).⁶⁷ On the other hand, those who define their primary identity along ethnic terms demonstrate somewhat weak support for the government's foreign policy strategy. This is especially true for those who describe their identity as solely Turk; 25 percent of these students believe that the AKP's foreign policy is on the wrong track. Overall, a strong association exists between social identity in the national context and support for the government's foreign policy strategies.⁶⁸ This relationship is more visible, as a positive correlation, when a religiously informed identity is considered. However, no

clear and strong association is observed between identity in relation to the international context and support for the AKP's foreign policy. While those who consider themselves both European and Middle Eastern and only Middle Eastern appear to be slightly more supportive of the government's policy, the differences with the other identity groupings remain miniscule.

The above results show that domestically oriented identity strongly informs support for or opposition to the AKP's foreign policy among university students. More specifically, Islamic identity alone and when prioritized within overlapping forms of identity is significantly associated with support for the government's foreign policy. While these results cannot empirically substantiate an electoral connection or an elite-mass linkage, they clearly show that students holding religious forms of identity demonstrate support for AKP policies. This is an interesting insight from the results of the survey, but we also need to examine whether a similar relationship is observed between identity and an individual's preferences of more specific foreign policy strategies.

In the survey, the participants were asked: "Where does Turkey's future lie?" Table 3 and 4 provide a cross-tabulation of respondents' views about the future of the country and self-reported nationally and internationally situated identities. The percentages demonstrate a strong statistical association between domestically oriented identity and perceptions of the future of the country's foreign policy directions (see Table 3).⁶⁹ Across most identity categories, significant proportions of respondents believe that Turkey's future is either in the European Union or the Turkic republics, while the proportion of university students who believe that Turkey's future lies in the Middle East and the Islamic world is generally lower. Not surprisingly, 43 percent of the respondents who describe their identity primarily as "Turk" favor a future orientation toward the Turkic republics. Similarly, a sizable proportion of individuals who define their primary

identity as Muslim believe that their country's future is in the Muslim world (23%), though this proportion is lower than those who believe that Turkey's future lies in the EU (35%) or in the Turkic republics (27%).

The results in Table 3 combined with the other findings discussed above show that the association between social identity and youth's perceptions of foreign policy is multifaceted. First, most university students describe state identity in nationalistic terms (i.e., Turkish). Second, a positive association is observed between support for the AKP's foreign policy and Islamic/ethnic identity. Third, when prescribing future goals in international affairs, university students assign greatest weight to the European Union and the Turkic world. This last finding is particularly important; it shows that while religious identity is correlated to greater support for the AKP's foreign policy choices, most students see Turkey's future in the European Union and the Turkic world. These two positions are not necessarily at odds, because the AKP's foreign policy activism relies on a geostrategic and realist strategy while also exploiting the geocultural identities unique to Turkey.

More interesting results can be seen in the cross-tabulation of perceptions of the future direction of Turkey and internationally oriented identity (see Table 4). Across all internationally situated identity groupings, the priority is given either to the EU or the Turkic world. The EU is perceived to be the primary region for future policy strategies by 47 percent of the respondents who identify as European, 28 percent who identify as Middle Eastern, 33 percent holding a global citizenship identity, and 32 percent of those who combine a European and Middle Eastern identity. The respective ratios are very similar for the choice prioritizing the Turkic world. Interestingly, across all international identity categories, the Islamic world and the Middle East are ranked lower than the EU and the Turkic republics. For example, of those who hold a Middle

Eastern identity, only 16 percent believe that the future of Turkey is in the Middle East, compared to a rate of 34 percent who see the future of the country in the Turkic republics.

CONCLUSION

Turkey's recent foreign policy involvement in the Middle East has drawn considerable attention. A novel characteristic of Turkish foreign policy in the AKP era is the increasing degree of interaction between domestic politics and international relations. As foreign policy choices become more connected to the electoral fortunes of the political parties, public opinion and individual choices gain more weight and identity becomes more salient because of its capacity to shape individual preferences and attitudes. In this paper, I have examined the relationship between social identity and attitudes about foreign policy in Turkey, utilizing data from an original survey conducted among university students to empirically test this relationship. Despite some limitations, the empirical analysis of the survey data reveals interesting insights about the association between social identity and perceptions of foreign policy.

Most educated youth conditionally support the AKP's foreign policy choices and about one-third of them believe that the current foreign policy is on the wrong track. While about half of the respondents (47%) define Turkey's state identity as Turk, only a small percentage (11%) of the students view its state identity as Middle Eastern.⁷⁰ When asked about foreign policy goals, significant numbers of respondents report that Turkey should be a leader in the Middle East, the Balkans, or the Turkic republics. Individuals appear to be less enthusiastic about Turkey's accession to the EU as a foreign policy goal.

Moving beyond these general perceptions, the young and educated segment of the Turkish electorate believes that Turkey's future lies in the EU or the Turkic republics. Only a

small fraction of the respondents has an orientation toward the Middle East or the Islamic world. It appears that individuals develop attitudes differently about the goals and the future of foreign policy. When it comes to the former, most educated youth appear to emphasize foreign policy strategies that are more in line with a nationalistic perception of state identity. This view is compatible with Davutoğlu's strategic depth approach, which favors a multidimensional policy exploiting multiple identities. Since Davutoğlu has implemented his foreign policy vision as Turkish foreign minister, the finding shows that university students carry orientations that are in line with this theoretically inspired policy framework. Furthermore, students' orientations appear to be in line with the scholarly approach explaining foreign policy activities with notions such as balance of power, geopolitics, and economic interests⁷¹ rather than with accounts describing the new directions in Turkish foreign policy as an axis shift or Middle Easternization.⁷²

The results also imply that defining identity with respect to the national and international attachments has an instrumental value. This distinction helps us better predict foreign policy choices among educated youth. Identity defined in terms of religious attachments more strongly informs preferences about foreign policy than do internationally oriented attachments. In particular, individuals who combine religious and ethnic attachments to define their identity may be more likely to make use of these feelings in forming their attitudes toward the AKP's foreign policy. For instance, those who hold an Islamic identity exclusively or in conjunction with ethnic identities are more likely to support the AKP's increased foreign policy involvement in the Middle East. At first look, this finding may be taken as supportive of the claim that the AKP is serving the needs of a religious constituency by Middle Easternizing Turkish foreign policy. However, the results also show that respondents holding the same religious identity may be supportive of active foreign policy in the EU, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Overall, the

findings from the survey suggest that an interest-based pattern of attitudes may be at work when the future goals of Turkey are considered. It can be argued that the predictive power of identity on attitudes toward foreign policy is conditioned by perceptions of national interest. Scholars of foreign policy are still debating the role of ideas and interests in foreign policy choices.⁷³ The results presented in this paper show that attachments of individuals to both multiple identities and national interest matter in shaping foreign policy preferences. Students of foreign policy need to conduct more analyses to explain the subtle ways in which identity and interest may interact to shape individual and state choices in international affairs.

Political Ideology*	Number	Percent
Marxist/Communist	11	1
Social Democrat	118	15
Center of Left	26	3
Center Left	15	2
Liberal	55	7
Democrat	136	17
Center Right	62	8
Nationalist	197	25
Conservative	87	11
Islamist	62	8
Strong Nationalist	31	4
Total	800	100

*The categories are selected based on the recommendations of experts on Turkish politics working in the same institution. Some categories were added after the pilot testing of the survey.

Table 1: Ideological Preferences of Students




Figure 1: Perceptions of Turkey's Role in International Relations


National Identity			International Identity		
	Number	Percent		Number	Percent
Muslim	60	8	European	92	12
First Muslim then Turk	226	28	Middle Eastern	166	21
First Muslim then Kurd	19	2	Global Citizen	281	35
First Turk then Muslim	53	7	Both European and Middle Eastern	261	33
First Kurd then Muslim	4	0.5			
Both Turk and Muslim	314	39			
Both Kurd and Muslim	26	3			
Turk	53	7			
Kurd	4	0.5			
Other	45	6			
Total	800	100%		800	100%

Pearson $\chi^2(27) = 38.6117$ Pr = 0.069 (Result from the cross-tabulation table)

Total percentage may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

Table 2: Nationally and Internationally Oriented Identity

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Pearson $\chi^2(6) = 2.7550$ Pr = 0.839

Pearson $\chi^2(10) = 79.6964$ Pr = 0.000

Figure 2: Identity and Support for the AKP's Foreign Policy:

	EU	Turkic World	Middle East	Muslim World	Other
Muslim	35	27	15	23	0
First Muslim then Turk	30	34	18	16	2
First Muslim then Kurd	47	11	21	16	5
Both Muslim and Turk	34	38	8	17	4
Both Muslim and Kurd	46	4	12	31	8
First Turk then Muslim	32	40	11	10	8
First Kurd then Muslim	25	0	0	75	0
Turk	27	43	6	16	8
Kurd	50	25	25	0	0
Other	33	18	18	20	11

Pearson $\chi^2(45) = 82.6387$ Pr = 0.001

Cell entries are percentages

Table 3: National Identity and Perceptions of Turkey's Future

	European Union	Middle East	Muslim World	Turkic Republics	Other (US, Caucasia)	Total (Percent in All)
European	47	9	18	23	3	92(12)
Middle Eastern	28	16	17	34	5	166(21)
Global Citizen	33	11	19	33	5	281(35)
Both European and Middle Eastern	32	14	15	36	3	261(33)

Pearson $\chi^2(12) = 17.0096$ Pr = 0.149

Cell entries are percentages

Table 4: International Identity and Perceptions of Turkey's Future

NOTES

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¹ The term “activism” refers to Turkey’s assertive and proactive foreign policy approach in a changing global world in the post-Cold War era and particularly under AKP rule since 2002. See Ziya Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique,” *Insight Turkey* 13 (2011): 47-65.

² Tarık Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?,” *Turkish Studies* 9 (2008): 3-20.

³ Michael Rubin, “Shifting Sides? The Problems of Neo-Ottomanism,” *National Review Online*, 10 August 2004, <http://www.michaelrubin.org/918/shifting-sides> (accessed 25 December 2010).

⁴ F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey’s New Geopolitics,” *Survival* 52 (2010): 157–80; Şaban Kardaş, “Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles?,” *Middle East Policy* 17 (2010): 115-36; Henri J. Barkey, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” *CERI Strategy Papers* 10 (2011), <http://lehigh.academia.edu/HenriBarkey/Papers/1034215/> (accessed 20 December 2011).

⁵ Steven A. Cook, “Turkey’s War at Home,” *Survival* 51 (2009): 105–20.

⁶ Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the JDP Era,” *Turkish Studies* 10 (2009): 7-24; Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy.”

⁷ Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey and the Great Powers," in *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem, and Philip Robins (Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 239-57.

⁸ Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy”; Bülent Aras and Aylin Görener, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation: The Ideational Bases of The Justice and Development Party's Foreign Policy Activism in The Middle East,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 12 (2010): 73-92; Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy.”

⁹ Ahmet Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges,” *Turkish Studies* 11 (2010): 103-23; Kemal Kirişçi, “Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State,” *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40 (2009): 29-57; Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy.”

¹⁰ Linda Herrera, “Youth and Generational Renewal in the Middle East,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 41 (2009): 368-71.

¹¹ Marilyn B. Brewer, “The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology,” *Political Psychology* 22 (2001): 115-25; Sean Carey, “Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?,” *European Union Politics* 3 (2002): 387-413.

¹² The Cyprus intervention is an example of a crisis with the Western powers. It would be hard to argue that Turkish foreign policy was completely monotonic during the Cold War. See Carter Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789-2007* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010).

¹³ Barkey, "Turkey and the Great Powers," 241.

¹⁴ Kemal Kirişci and Neslihan Kaptanoğlu, "The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle East Studies* 47 (2011): 705-24.

¹⁵ Dietrich Jung, "Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities," *Mediterranean Politics* 10 (2005): 1-17.

¹⁶ Ahmet Sözen, "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges," *Turkish Studies* 11 (2010): 103-23.

¹⁷ Öniş, "Multiple Faces of the 'New' Turkish Foreign Policy."

¹⁸ Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009): 169-92, 179.

¹⁹ Öniş and Yılmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism," 7-9.

²⁰ Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy"; Rubin, "Shifting Sides?"

²¹ Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy," 7.

²² Larrabee, "Turkey's New Geopolitics," 158.

²³ Barkey, "Turkish Foreign Policy," 9.

²⁴ For an overview see Kemal Kirişci, "Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40 (2009): 29-57; Sabri Sayarı, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," *Journal of International Affairs* 54 (2000): 169-83;

Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture in Turkey,” *Journal of International Affairs* 54 (2000): 199-216; and Barkey, “Turkey and the Great Powers.”

²⁵ The following discussion draws on Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007,” *Insight Turkey* 10 (2008): 77-96; and idem, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu*, 38th ed. (Istanbul: Küre, 2009).

²⁶ A shifting balance of power in the region, affected by changing U.S. interests, also helps to explain Turkey’s increasing activities in the region. The U.S administration supports Turkey’s EU membership bid to create a strong, democratic, pivotal, role-model state that would be an invaluable asset to U.S. interests in the larger Middle East. See Henri J. Barkey, “The Effect of US Policy in the Middle East on EU-Turkey Relations,” *International Spectator* 43 (2008): 31-44.

²⁷ Davutoğlu argues that given Turkey’s central position, Turkish foreign policy should be built on five related principles: balance between security and freedom, a zero-problem policy toward neighbors, improving relations with the neighboring countries and beyond, a multidimensional and complementary foreign policy, and rhythmic diplomacy. Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision,” 78-82.

²⁸ Kirişçi, “Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 31-32.

²⁹ Following Israel’s offensive on Gaza and the shouting exchange between Turkish prime minister Erdoğan and Israeli president Peres at the Davos Economic Forum, relations between the two countries became very tense; they deteriorated further after the attack on the aid flotilla and the killing of nine Turkish citizens on the “Mavi Marmara.”

³⁰ James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

³¹ Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003); Ümit Cizre, “Demythologizing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey,” *Middle East Journal* 57 (2003): 213–29; Aras and Görener, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Orientation.”

³² James N. Rosenau, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation* (New York: Random House, 1961); Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” *World Politics* 43 (1991): 479–512; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy,” *The American Political Science Review* 77 (1983): 175-90.

³³ Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990); Force Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force,” *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1992): 49-73; Ole R Holsti, *American Public Opinion on the Iraq War* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2011).

³⁴ Kirişçi’s account of Turkish foreign policy employs Rosecrance’s trading state and Putnam’s two-level game analogy. See Kirişçi “Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 41; Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); and Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games,” *International Organization* 42 (1988): 427-60.

³⁵ On the rise of the Anatolian tigers, see Hasan Kösebalaban, “The Rise of Anatolian Cities and the Failure of the Modernization Paradigm,” *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 16

(2007): 229-40; and Şebnem Gümüüşcü and Deniz Sert, “The Power of the Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 45 (2009): 953-68.

³⁶ Kirişci, “Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy,” 40-43.

³⁷ For similar approaches, see Kirişci and Kaptanoğlu, “The Politics of Trade”; Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy”; and Barkey, “Turkish Foreign Policy.”

³⁸ Öniş and Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism,” 15-16; Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Foreign Policy, Its Domestic Determinants and the Role of the European Union,” *South European Society and Politics* 16 (2011): 279-91, 281.

³⁹ Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy,” 9.

⁴⁰ Altunışık, “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy,” 169.

⁴¹ Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Foreign Policy,” 280.

⁴² Kirişci and Kaptanoğlu, “The Politics of Trade,” 714.

⁴³ Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy,” 5-13. The visit by Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, the cancellation of a military exercise with Israel, and Turkey’s pro-Palestine position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are frequently invoked as examples of the Islamization of foreign policy.

⁴⁴ Cook, “Turkey’s War at Home,” 111.

⁴⁵ Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2009).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁴⁷ Mustafa Aydın, “Twenty Years Before, Twenty Years After: Turkish Foreign Policy at the Threshold of the 21st Century,” in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics*, ed. Tareq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Aydın (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2003), 3-27.

⁴⁸ Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, “Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” in *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, ed. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), 1-25.

⁴⁹ Altunışık, “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy,” 169-70.

⁵⁰ Thomas Risse, “A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities,” in *Europeanization and Domestic Change*, ed. M. G. Cowles, J. Caporaso, and T. Risse (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000); Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University, 1996); Telhami and Barnett, “Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy.”

⁵¹ Bozdağlıoğlu, *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity*; Ümit Cizre, “Demythologizing the National Security Concept.”

⁵² On social identity theory, see H. Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and H. Tajfel and J. C. Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” in *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, ed. S. Worchel and W. Austin (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), 7–24. For applications of social identity theory in foreign policy analysis, see Tomas Risse, S.C. Ropp, and K. Sikkink, eds., *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1999); and Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002).

⁵³ Tajfel, *Human Groups and Social Categories*, 251.

⁵⁴ Tajfel and Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.”

⁵⁵ Telhami and Barnett, “Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy,” 8.

⁵⁶ Brewer, “The Many Faces of Social Identity”; Carey, “Undivided Loyalties.”

⁵⁷ P. A. Thoits and L.V. Virshup, “Me's and We's: Forms and Functions of Social Identities,” in *Self and Identity: Fundamental Issues*, ed. R. Ashmore and L. Jussim (New York: Oxford University Press), 1:106-33.

⁵⁸ Scholarship on the Middle Easternization or Islamization of Turkish foreign policy builds on a similar logic by implying that the AKP's foreign policy goals are tailored to gain support of the religiously conservative public, which is presumed to be more likely to perceive the Middle East or Islamic world as part of the in-group.

⁵⁹ Altunışık, “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy.”

⁶⁰ To the best of my knowledge, the only systematic surveys of foreign policy attitudes are those conducted by the International Strategic Research Institute (Turkish acronym USAK). Since 2004, USAK has conducted four such surveys; the last one can be found at http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/TDPAnket4_TFP.pdf (accessed 21 December 2010).

⁶¹ Eleven percent of the students attended vocational colleges, 9 percent studied science and literature, 9 percent attended the college of engineering, 4 percent studied the arts, and 3 percent attended the medical school and other departments.

⁶² The distribution was as follows: East (11%), Southeast (3%), Central (15%), Mediterranean (11%), Black Sea (21%), Marmara (6%), Aegean (3%). I also cross-tabulated socioeconomic status and region, socioeconomic status and province, gender and region, etc., and the distribution of the responses shows that the sample is generally representative along all of these lines. These tables and more detailed results about the representativeness of the sample are available from the author upon request.

⁶³ I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing to this fact and inspiring the following discussion.

⁶⁴ See Telhami and Barnett, “Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy,” for a review of the literature on national identity and foreign policy in the Middle East.

⁶⁵ The original survey also included a question about Alevi identity as an alternative to a Sunni-Muslim identity. However, this category was removed due to some administrative difficulties. Many colleagues and students also voiced concerns about the inclusion of the category. However, since the survey included “other” as a category, I believe the preferences of this group are captured in the analysis.

⁶⁶ The chi-2 test based on the cross-tabulation of the two variables measuring national and social identity shows that the distinction between the two concepts is justified. Chi-2 statistics is a common statistical tool that tests the difference between the actual observations and hypothetical observations that could be expected by chance. A statistically significant statistics ($p < .05$) shows that the existing distribution of responses is not obtained by chance.

⁶⁷ The high percentage of support for foreign policy among those who identify as Kurd and Muslim may be due to the electoral support the AKP has in Southeastern Turkey, where the

Kurdish minority is concentrated. Since the 2002 elections, the AKP has emerged as the main contender to the ethnic Kurdish parties in this region. It is known that religious segments of Kurds as well as Turks mainly vote for the AKP; thus it is likely that religiously identified Kurdish students support the AKP's foreign policy choices.

⁶⁸ Chi-2 statistics is statistically significant.

⁶⁹ Once again the chi-2 statistic is statistically significant beyond the 0.05 level.

⁷⁰ This finding is in line with Telhami and Barnett's argument that state identity is widely defined in nationalistic terms (Telhami and Barnett, "Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy").

⁷¹ Larrabee, "Turkey's New Geopolitics"; Barkey, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East"; Kirişci, "Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy."

⁷² Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy"; Rubin, "Shifting Sides?"

⁷³ See Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics: A Review Essay," *Review of International Studies*, 30 (2004): 229-44; and Telhami and Barnett, "Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy."