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Abstract

This article explains the determinants of individual support for democracy in 10 Muslim-majority countries. Starting with economic and cultural interpretations of modernization theory, the author advances an argument exploring cross-linkages between macro- and micro-level implications of this theory as they relate to attitudes toward democracy. The author also provides a test of two alternative explanations: social capital and Islamic values. A series of cross-national and ordinary least squares regressions utilizing the fourth wave of the World Values Survey demonstrates that, 50 years later, modernization theory is still a powerful tool for explaining democratic attitudes. Particularly, perceptions of gender equality show strong associations with democratic orientations. Although some support is found for the positive effect of political trust, religiosity and Islamic values poorly predict support for democracy in the Muslim world.

Keywords

democracy, Islam, modernization, religiosity, democratic attitudes, gender equality

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Do Muslims support democracy? According to the recent polls, popular support for democracy is strikingly high in the Muslim world. To cite a few examples, the World Values Survey (WVS; Inglehart & Norris, 2003), the Gallup Poll (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007), and Hassan's (2008) comparative surveys show that Muslims view democracy favorably. Although a lively conceptual debate has taken place among scholars about the theological incompatibility (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1999; Kedourie, 1992) or compatibility (El-Affendi, 2003; Esposito & Voll, 1996) of Islam with democracy, the focus of this article is the actual attitudes of Muslims. The research question is this: What are the individual-level determinants of support for democracy in the Muslim world?

Understanding support for democracy among Muslims is important in several ways. First, if attitudes and values are crucial for the emergence and sustainability of democracy (Inglehart, 2000, p. 96; Mainwaring, 1999, p. 45; Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer, 1998, p. 96), it is imperative to explore citizen attitudes for a better understanding of the freedom gap in certain parts of the Islamic world, particularly the *exceptionalism* in Arab countries (Stepan & Robertson, 2003, 2004). Second, support for democracy appears to be a robust measure of democratic orientations across regimes (Jamal & Nooruddin, 2006, p. 7), and looking at the Muslim world especially may shed further light on this topic. Finally, such an endeavor is also likely to advance our understanding of the relationship between Islam and democracy at the micro level. This last point gains prominence when a micro-level analysis is carried out in Muslim countries with various Islamic traditions and divergent development paths.

So far, few students of comparative politics have investigated the determinants of individual support for democracy in Muslim countries (Bratton, 2003; Hoffman, 2004; Jamal, 2006; Rose, 2002; Tessler, 2002). These studies, however, have focused only on select regions such as Arab countries (Jamal, 2006; Tessler, 2002), Turkic nations of central Asia (Rose, 2002), African nations (Bratton, 2003), and non-Arabic Muslim countries (Hoffman, 2004). Past studies have also utilized various theoretical approaches in their analyses, but they have not tested the relevant theories simultaneously. Although Hoffman (2004) used explanations related to religious orientation and political and civic culture, Tessler (2002) incorporated religiosity, Islamic political values, and gender in his analysis. Jamal (2006) and Bratton (2003), on the other hand, modeled individual support for democracy as a function of modernization and religious values.

Following the footsteps of this research, I examine the individual-level determinants of support for democracy in 10 Muslim-majority countries. The

main contribution of the article relates to the *simultaneous* test of multiple theories within a *diverse sample* of Muslim countries. The sample includes countries with varying levels of economic development, different democracy or authoritarianism practices, and diverse Islamic traditions from Asia, Europe, the Arab Middle East, and Africa. The analysis also demonstrates which individual characteristics matter most and their substantive effects on support for democracy.

I advance a theoretical argument proposing that the change in citizens' material conditions and cultural values following modernization is vital for explaining democratic orientations. I also test the implications of social capital theory as well as the religious values approach as alternative explanations of support for democracy. The research findings imply that cultural values brought about by modernization such as perceptions of gender equality and tolerance as well as the material conditions such as higher levels of education and income are good predictors of individual support for democracy in the Muslim world. The evidence in favor of the relationship between Islamic religiosity and democracy at the individual level is mixed at best. I interpret these results from a policy perspective and discuss the implications of these findings for the chances of democracy in the authoritarian world and its consolidation in the competitive regimes of the Muslim world.

In the next section, I derive individual-level theoretical implications from modernization theory and alternative explanations. Then, the data (from the fourth wave of the WVS) and theoretical model are introduced, followed by the results of the cross-sectional and country-level ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses. The final section provides a summary discussion of the results and concludes.

Modernization and Democratic Orientations

The proponents of modernization theory contend that there is a common path leading to democracy (Lerner, 1958; Lipset, 1959; Lipset, Seong, & Torres, 1993), which begins with socioeconomic modernization and ends with political modernization. As briefly stated by Coppedge (1997), "Developing countries [will undergo] a process of political modernization whose end-state, stable democracy, would be achieved to the extent that they achieved socioeconomic modernization, urbanization, the spread of mass media and rising levels of education, wealth and equality" (p. 177).

Insofar as individual-level implications of modernization theory are considered, modernization is believed to generate improvements in the

education and wealth of people. Citizens who hold and appreciate democratic values emerge as a by-product of this process. In addition, a sizeable middle and working class with democratic orientations, again considered a product of modernization, is considered a prerequisite for sustainable democracy (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992).

The relationship of development and democracy, however, has proven to be more subtle than this linear economic scheme. "Multiple modernities" may emerge as a result of interaction between modernizing forces and the existing cultural and institutional structures in a country (Eisenstadt, 2000, pp. 13-15). This may generate different cultural values, attitudes, and economic conditions cross-nationally. Furthermore, when class-state relations are considered, the relationship demonstrates a very complex nature. First, members of the middle and working class may not necessarily oppose authoritarian practices. It is argued that members of the middle and working class will challenge authoritarian practices if and only if they experience considerable independence from the state (Kamrava, 2005). To elaborate, if an authoritarian state controls a substantial portion of its citizens' behavior by providing jobs and benefits (e.g., tax-free income), the modernization process may not necessarily create a democratically oriented citizenry (Bellin, 2002; Kamrava, 2005). This is particularly valid for the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East, where clientelism contaminates the political life and serves to legitimize authoritarian practices (Lust-Okar, 2008). The existence of a strong government in political and economic life may depress the emergence of "critical citizens" (Norris, 1999), particularly those among the middle class. This tendency, combined with the clientelistic nature of the political system (especially in certain parts of the Muslim world), may strengthen authoritarian values and prevent the emergence of a democratic citizenry.

Furthermore, a mutually beneficial relationship exists between states and certain segments of societies in the Middle Eastern countries. The state policies especially targeted middle classes (using state-owned enterprises; Richards & Waterbury, 2008) and organized labor (by controlling the trade unions; Posusney, 1997) to maintain this relationship. Although the development of a strong private sector independent of the state may have eventually begun to undermine the power of the authoritarian state and created a citizenry equipped with democratic values, *rentierism* (Richards & Waterbury, 2008) or the "resource curse" (Ross, 2001) provided the state with some autonomy from the public by removing the government reliance on taxes in the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries and the other parts of the Islamic world (i.e., workers' remittances and tourism revenues in Morocco and Turkey). Therefore, modernization may not necessarily foster democratic attitudes in

a linear fashion. Insofar as individual attitudes are concerned, one may expect that workers, members of the middle class, and individuals who desire an increased role for government as opposed to that of the private sector will be less supportive of democracy. However, one should also observe variation in this relationship with respect to the modernization path of a country.

The second reason for the problematic nature of the teleological interpretation of modernization theory concerns its cultural implications. Although, modernization is expected to foster mass democratic values and beliefs as a result of industrialization, urbanization, and increased wealth and education, it is not clear how these values and beliefs are brought about or whether they are causes or consequences of democratization. Furthermore, Lipset (1994, p. 3), the strongest proponent of modernization theory, declared that cultural factors are more important than modernization for the prospect of democracy and that certain faiths, such as Islam, Christian orthodoxy, and Confucianism, are fundamentally incompatible with democratic values. Inglehart (1990) argued that economic development leads to cultural changes that in turn lead to democracy. More recently, Inglehart and Norris (2003) argued that the real fault line between Islam and the West is not political. Rather, they claimed that what divides the two cultures are values and attitudes related to the perceptions of gender equality and tolerance. As individuals move to urban areas, get better education, and increase their wealth, they are also expected to become more secular, more accepting of women's roles in society, and socially more tolerant in general (Jamal, 2006; Moghadam, 2003). In their recent analyses, Hoffman (2004) and Jamal (2006) found evidence supporting this argument.¹ According to a cultural interpretation of modernization theory, it can be expected that individuals with positive perceptions of gender equality and those who are more tolerant will be more supportive of democracy compared to those lacking these opinions.

Alternative Explanations

Two alternative explanations may be useful for explaining individual support for democracy in the Muslim world. First, according to the proponents of the civic culture perspective, the existence of active citizens who hold democratic values is central to democracy, and only "participant cultures" can provide a psychological basis for democratization (Almond & Verba, 1989, p. 9). Social trust, according to this argument, is essential for the permanence of democracy because it provides the basis for cooperation among the members of society. It also enhances associational activity and reciprocity and consequently leads to meaningful political participation

(Putnam, 1993). More importantly, at the institutional level, scholars agree that political trust (i.e., trust in governmental institutions) legitimizes democratic institutions and makes efficient governance possible (Gamson, 1968; Mishler & Rose, 1997).

Students of civic culture also emphasize the critical role of trust for the generation of positive views of democracy (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005, p. 41). Past studies have found that at both societal and individual levels, a higher level of trust, institutional or social, is positively associated with higher levels of support for democracy (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Seligson, 2002, p. 275). At the individual level, this line of reasoning suggests a positive relationship between trust, social or political, and support for democracy.

This approach has recently been challenged. Jamal (2007a, 2007b), investigating the meaning and utility of social trust in the Arab Middle East, found that in authoritarian settings a higher level of social trust is associated with support for the existing regime, and hence lower levels of trust may be more conducive to democracy. Linking social trust to confidence in institutions, Jamal and Nooruddin (2006) argue,

Hence, levels of generalized trust need not be associated with support for democracy. In fact we argue that higher levels of generalized trust are more useful to support for democracy in settings that are *already* democratic. In other words, generalized trust without democracy has little “democratic utility” of its own. (p. 6)

Therefore, one needs to exercise caution before proposing a positive relationship between trust and support for democracy. A negative relationship can be expected in authoritarian regimes.

The second alternative explanation relates to piety and Islamic values. Although there is a longstanding debate about the compatibility of Islam with democracy at the conceptual level among scholars and Muslim intellectuals (for an excellent review, see El Fadl, Cohen, and Chasman, 2004),² empirical evidence concerning the actual attitudes of Muslims has come out only recently. At the elite level, some research has paid attention to progressive Muslims (El-Affendi, 2003) and the new Muslim democrats of Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia (Nasr, 2005). In addition, evidence from the WVS shows that most Muslims support democracy. Analyzing the responses from a Gallup Poll, Esposito and Mogahed (2007, p. 48) conclude that a significant majority of Muslims support democracy, but they also embrace Islamic values. They also state that the results of the “Gallup Poll indicate that wanting Sharia does not

automatically translate into wanting theocracy” (p. 50). Similarly, based on his extensive surveys, Hassan (2008) concludes that religion and politics may coexist in an autonomous and cooperative way. The evidence is impressive, and it implies that individuals may be religious and have democratic orientations at the same time. Contrary to the implications of conceptual or theological arguments putting Islam (or some cultures) at odds with democracy (Lipset, 1994), piety or Islamist values may have nothing to do with democracy. Previous studies have tested the negative relationship between Islamic values and support for democracy and have not found much evidence supporting such a relationship (Hoffman, 2004; Jamal, 2006; Tessler, 2002).

To reiterate, I test hypotheses related to cultural and economic implications of modernization theory at the individual level. I propose that education, income (economic components), positive perceptions of gender equality, and tolerance (cultural attitudes brought by modernization) should be positively and the desire for more government involvement should be negatively related to support for democracy. I also test whether social and political trust is positively associated with democracy but expect that this relationship may be negative in more authoritarian settings. Islamic religiosity is also controlled for to test whether piety and Islamic values have an effect (positive or negative) on support for democracy.

Data

To test these hypotheses, the present study uses the fourth wave of the WVS. Fieldwork in the countries included in the analysis was completed before the end of 2001. Ten Muslim countries were selected based on the majority status of Muslims and the availability of survey questions. These countries include Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey.³ The selected countries capture the diverse Islamic traditions, and they include three Arab nations, one from sub-Saharan Africa, two from Europe, and three south Asian countries, in addition to Turkey. These countries represent different regime types including electoral democracies, authoritarian republics, and monarchies. Table 1 presents the rankings of these countries according to the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI; 2001), their Freedom House status (2001) and GDP per capita (2001), and their percentage support for democracy calculated from the WVS.⁴

All countries in the sample are ranked partly free, with the exception of Egypt and Pakistan. All but Pakistan and Nigeria (low HDI score) are

Table 1. Summary Statistics for the Selected Countries

Country	Human Development Index (HDI) ranking	GDP per capita ^a	Freedom House status ^b	Percentage support for democracy
Albania	95	3,800	Partly free	87
Bangladesh	139	1,750	Partly free	93
Bosnia and Herzegovina	66	1,800	Partly free	88
Egypt	120	3,700	Not free	93
Indonesia	112	3,000	Partly free	62
Jordan	90	4,200	Partly free	76
Morocco	126	3,700	Partly free	80
Nigeria	152 ^c	840	Partly free	47
Pakistan	144 ^c	2,100	Not free	80
Turkey	96	6,700	Partly free	80

a. GDP per capita measures are from the CIA World Factbook.

b. Freedom House scores as of 2007 from freedomhouse.org.

c. Low HDI country.

ranked at medium human development in 2000 and 2001. The selected nations also differ widely in terms of their GDP per capita, ranging between \$800 (Nigeria) to \$6,700 (Turkey). The sample also nicely captures the different modernization stages throughout the Muslim world as can be seen in the different HDI rankings. Almost all countries have high rates of support for democracy, except for Nigeria with 47% and Indonesia with 62% support for democracy.

Dependent Variable: Diffuse and Specific Support for Democracy⁵

The concept of democracy does not have a common definition (Esposito & Voll, 1996). Recently, Jamal and Tessler (2008) used evidence from the Arab Barometer Survey to demonstrate that Arab citizens understand democracy in different terms. Fortunately, the WVS includes multiple items that allow measuring support for democracy in various ways. These items are listed below.⁶

1. In democracy, the economic system runs poorly.
2. Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling.
3. Democracies are not good at maintaining order.

4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.
5. Having a democratic political system is very bad, bad, good, or very good.

The first three items are about the outcomes of democratic governance, whereas the last two ask the respondents to provide a general assessment of democracy. Factor analysis was conducted with these five items, and two factors were extracted. The first three items tapping respondents' opinions about specific outcomes of democratic governance load strongly on a first factor (factor loadings are .80, .77, and .77, respectively, with a Cronbach's alpha of .75), and the last two items tapping respondent attitudes regarding overall support for democracy load on a second factor (factor loadings are .77 and .62, with a Cronbach's alpha of .52). This distinction resembles Easton's (1965) typology of *diffuse* and *specific* support.⁷ I prefer to use Easton's concepts below; however, I approach the results of the factor analysis cautiously as the use of these concepts does not mean that I use specific and diffuse support in a pure Eastonian sense.

Based on the results of the factor analysis, two additive indices were created. The first is an additive scale of the first three items, and it ranges from 3 to 12. This variable is called *specific support for democracy*. The second index measures overall support for democracy and is constructed by adding the last two items (and it ranges from 2 to 8). This variable is called *diffuse support for democracy*. The two measures are positively and significantly correlated (.22); however, the q-q plot clearly shows that the two concepts capture different dimensions of democratic support (available from the author on request).

Independent Variables

The first set of independent variables operationalizes the individual-level indicators of modernization theory. Self-reported measures of *education* (8-point scale) and *income* (10-point scale) are used to assess whether increased wealth and education generate favorable attitudes toward democracy. Four dummy variables were created for testing the effect of perceived membership of class on attitudes toward democracy—low class, working class, lower-middle class and upper-middle class (upper class is the reference category). The implication of modernization theory is that working and middle class members will be more supportive of democracy. However, in countries where these classes are dependent on the states, one

may expect to see a negative or no relationship. To measure *perceptions of government* role, I used an item asking the respondents to place their views on a 10-point scale ranging from “people should take more responsibility” (1) to “the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” (10). I expect a negative relation with support for democracy, as higher values may be indicative of dependence on state resources. However, given the diverse modernization paths, the sign of this variable may vary across countries.

To test the cultural implications of modernization theory, I created two variables. *Perceptions of gender equality* is an index of three items (i.e., “men should have more right to a job when jobs are scarce,” “a university education is more important for boys,” and “men make better political leaders”) that loaded strongly on a single underlying factor. The responses were recoded such that higher values represent positive perceptions of gender equality. To measure *social tolerance*, a factor analysis was run on multiple items, asking the respondents which groups they would not like to see as their neighbors. The responses associated with two groups—immigrants and people of another race—loaded strongly on a common underlying dimension. An index of tolerance was then created, ranging from 0 (*no reservation in seeing any members of these groups as a neighbor*) to 2 (*do not want to see both groups as neighbors*). This index was reversed to measure increased tolerance at higher levels. A positive association is expected between these two variables and support for democracy.

Two measures of trust were created to test the hypotheses related to social capital. *Political trust* is an additive index of four items evaluating confidence in the parliament, political parties, government, and civil services. Higher values on this index represent more confidence in political institutions. *Interpersonal trust* (or social trust) is measured by a single item asking the respondents to state whether most people can be trusted or one needs to be very careful in dealing with people. This variable is coded as a dummy variable where lack of interpersonal trust is coded as 0 and its existence takes the value of 1. These variables will allow me test whether trust is positively associated with support for democracy in all Muslim countries or a differential effect is in order between democratic and authoritarian regimes as suggested by recent research (Jamal, 2007a, 2007b).

To test the effect of religiosity, an item about the respondents' frequency of attending religious services (7-point scale) is used (Hoffman, 2004; Jamal, 2006; Rose, 2002; Tessler, 2002). A second measure taps the importance of piety in public officials as perceived by individuals and is called *political Islamism*. This measure was created using an item asking the respondents to

evaluate if politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office on a 4-point scale ranging from *disagree strongly* (4) to *agree strongly* (1). Given the conceptual debate about incompatibility of Islam and democracy, one may expect this variable to be negatively related to support for democracy. However, based on the findings of recent polls and diverse Islamic traditions, a negative relation or no relation may be observed.

Also controlled in the analyses are *age*, *gender*, and perceptions of *satisfaction with the financial situation*. Of these control variables, the effect of gender on support for democracy is especially highlighted by past studies (Tessler, 2002), in which females have been found to be less supportive of democracy than males. Satisfaction with the financial situation controls for the perceived status of economic situation, and I expect that this variable will have a more pronounced effect on specific support for democracy and that it will have differential effects across countries. A detailed description of independent variables is provided in Appendix A.

Method

I ran a series of OLS regressions including cross-sectional and separate country estimations. One major drawback of survey research is the high rate of missing data because of nonresponses. In the data used, the percentage of missing values was 22% for religious service attendance. When all variables of interest are included in the regression model, the number of cases retained in the sample drops to 6,409 (only 46% of all respondents) as a result of listwise deletion.⁸

Political scientists generally either replace the missing values by educated guesses (e.g., means) or perform listwise deletion, which results in “a loss of valuable information at best and severe selection bias at worst” (King, Honaker, Joseph, & Scheve, 2001, p. 49). An alternative to listwise deletion is *multiple imputation*, which involves imputing *m* values for a missing cell based on the existing information (i.e., observed cells). I used Amelia II, developed by Honaker, King, and Blackwell (2007). I ran five imputations of the data in Amelia II and later combined the imputed data sets by calculating the mean values in Stata 9.⁹

Results¹⁰

First, I ran cross-sectional models for specific support and diffuse support with fixed effects. Table 2 presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS estimations.

Table 2. Cross-Sectional Regression Estimates of Specific and Diffuse Support for Democracy

	Diffuse support	Specific support
Modernization		
Tolerance	0.032** (0.014)	0.069*** (0.027)
Perceptions of gender equality	0.024*** (0.007)	0.124*** (0.012)
Education	0.038*** (0.005)	0.017* (0.010)
Low class	0.096* (0.059)	0.108 (0.118)
Working class	0.110** (0.056)	-0.009 (0.112)
Lower middle class	0.071 (0.052)	-0.092 (0.105)
Upper middle class	0.032 (0.054)	-0.193* (0.109)
Income	0.010* (0.006)	0.044*** (0.012)
Perceptions of government involvement	-0.007* (0.004)	0.007 (0.007)
Social capital		
Interpersonal trust	0.004 (0.023)	0.103** (0.043)
Political trust	0.020*** (0.004)	0.050*** (0.008)
Islamic values		
Religiosity	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.012)
Political Islamism	-0.030*** (0.009)	-0.075*** (0.018)
Control variables		
Satisfaction with finances	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.020** (0.008)
Age	0.003*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.002)
Female	-0.118*** (0.023)	-0.264*** (0.042)
Albania	-0.251*** (0.052)	-0.281*** (0.107)
Bangladesh	-0.013 (0.034)	0.015 (0.065)

(continued)

Table 2. (continued)

	Diffuse support	Specific support
Bosnia	-0.619*** (0.059)	-0.609*** (0.109)
Indonesia	-1.188*** (0.045)	-0.507*** (0.078)
Jordan	-0.600*** (0.045)	-0.396*** (0.097)
Morocco	0.200*** (0.047)	-0.863*** (0.124)
Nigeria	-1.002*** (0.050)	-1.881*** (0.098)
Pakistan	-0.544*** (0.046)	-0.991*** (0.083)
Turkey	-0.616*** (0.039)	-1.147*** (0.071)
Constant	6.750*** (0.116)	7.709*** (0.224)
Observations	12,013	10,898
R ²	.12	.11

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Egypt is the reference country.

*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.

The results in Table 2 lend strong support to cultural and partial support to economic implications of modernization theory. As expected, tolerance and perceptions of gender equality are positively related to support for democracy in both models (Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Education and income have positive and significant effects on both specific and diffuse support, confirming these hypotheses (Lipset, 1959). Neither class membership nor perceptions of government involvement consistently reaches statistical significance. This result is surprising given the well-established theoretical literature about the role of middle and working class attitudes in transition to and consolidation of democracy.

Among the indicators of social capital theory, political trust is statistically significant with a positive coefficient, whereas interpersonal trust reaches statistical significance in the specific support model. As for the Islamic values approach, only political Islamism is negatively related to both modes of support in a statistically significant way. Religiosity does not reach statistical significance in either model, which is congruent with the findings of previous studies (Hoffman, 2004; Jamal, 2006; Tessler, 2002). Finally, Muslim




Figure 1. Percentage change in specific and diffuse support (pooled model)

women, on average, are found to be more skeptical of democracy compared to Muslim men (Jamal, 2006; Tessler, 2002).

To demonstrate the substantive effects of selected indicators on support for democracy, I calculated the effects of the significant coefficients on support for democracy by increasing each variable from its minimum to its maximum value while holding other variables at their means. These effects are transformed to reflect the percentage change (increase or decrease) in the dependent variable and are reported in Figure 1.

Overall, the results of the pooled model lend support to all three theories; however, cultural and economic indicators related to modernization have generally stronger effects on support for democracy. The substantive effects of the significant predictors, especially those with an economic character such as income and satisfaction with finances, are larger for specific support, indicating that the impact of individual characteristics is more pronounced when tangible outcomes of a democratic regime are considered.

Perceptions of gender equality has the strongest substantive effect on specific support for democracy. For example, specific support for democracy is

15% higher for an individual with positive opinions about gender equality relative to someone with negative perceptions, and this is larger than the combined effect of political trust and political Islamism. It is argued that the modernization process will bring a change in the economic and social life, which may in turn lead to a change in attitudes. As urbanization and industrialization increase the social mobility and as the female employment increases, this may result in an attitudinal shift (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Jamal, 2006; Moghadam, 2003; Tessler, 2002), which may generate favorable attitudes toward democracy.

As for the objective economic conditions created by modernization, both education and income are significantly related to democracy. Interestingly, the impact of education is more pronounced for diffuse support, whereas wealth has a larger effect for specific support. This implies that higher levels of education increase favorable attitudes toward democracy in a general way, whereas economic status leads people to evaluate democracy based on its specific outcome. Regardless of the type of impact, the effects of modernization tend to generate more support for democracy at the attitudinal level. Other indicators of modernization theory do not appear to be important, as the significant effects for class membership as well as the perceptions of government involvement are scarce and their substantive effects are modest.

The difference between the negative and positive ends of political trust generates a 9% increase in the specific support for democracy. Although this is a large and expected effect, it may be an artifact of measurement.¹¹ The substantive effects of tolerance and interpersonal trust are modest, and the latter makes a difference only for specific support. More interestingly, religiosity has no discernable effect, whereas stronger preferences for religious individuals in public offices decrease diffuse support by only 2% and specific support by 4%. This result shows that at the attitudinal level, being a pious Muslim does not necessarily have a negative impact on attitudes toward democracy (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007; Hassan, 2008; Jamal, 2006; Rose, 2002; Tessler, 2002).

Although the pooled models are a useful starting point, separate country regressions can provide more nuanced information about why Muslims support democracy in different parts of the Muslim world. Islam is certainly not monolithic across the board, and Muslim countries have experienced "multiple modernities" (Eisenstadt, 2000). These differences certainly may have an effect on individual attitudes. I present a table of significance and substantive effects calculated as the percentage change in the dependent variable from the country regressions (for both models; see Table 3). The regression

Table 3. Percentage Change in Specific and Diffuse Support for Democracy (Regression Estimates in 10 Muslim Nations)

Country	Type of support	Modernization										Social capital			Islamic values		Other	
		Tolerance	Gender equality	Education	Lower class	Low middle	Upper middle	Working class	Income	Role of govern.	Personal trust	Political trust	Religiosity	Political Islamism	Female	Female		
Albania	Diffuse	10.3 ^{***}	7.3 ^{**}	2.8	-4.3	-2.6	0.1	-2.1	0.1	-1.5	-0.4	0.0	0.1	-1.0	-1.5			
Albania	Specific	15.4 ^{***}	34.9 ^{***}	2.6	0.4	-5.0	4.5	-5.0	25.5 ^{***}	-13.3 ^{***}	-2.5	8.1 [*]	1.6	0.2	-5.1 ^{***}			
Bosnia	Diffuse	2.1	0.6	2.5	-7.1	-2.1	-3.9	-1.1	-6.6	-5.6 ^{***}	-1.7	3.1	6.9 ^{***}	0.7	-0.5			
Bosnia	Specific	4.2	36.5 ^{***}	5.4	14.6	13.8	11.4	13.2	12.8 [*]	9.1 ^{**}	-5.4 [*]	1.2	3.2	-14.9 ^{***}	-1.5			
Turkey	Diffuse	3.1 ^{***}	7.8 ^{***}	7.9 ^{***}	5.1 ^{**}	4.4 ^{**}	3.8 ^{**}	5.0 ^{***}	-2.7	2.4 ^{**}	2.2 ^{***}	0.0	0.0	-4.3 ^{***}	-0.8			
Turkey	Specific	1.6	4.4 [*]	6.6 ^{***}	3.2	-1.0	-0.4	0.1	2.1	0.9	1.9	2.5	-1.2	-13.2 ^{***}	-2.4 ^{**}			
Bangladesh	Diffuse	-2.3 ^{***}	1.5	3.3 ^{***}	-1.0	1.6	0.7	0.7	3.3	-5.8 ^{***}	0.9	15.1 ^{***}	1.1	-4.5 ^{***}	0.1			
Bangladesh	Specific	-1.9	17.4 ^{***}	-4.1 ^{***}	5.5 [*]	7.0 ^{**}	0.8	8.3 ^{***}	12.9 ^{***}	-0.3	-1.6	8.7 ^{***}	0.0	1.5	-1.2			
Pakistan	Diffuse	-4.0	-1.3	-6.4 ^{***}	10.9 ^{***}	8.5 ^{**}	7.4 ^{**}	7.6 ^{**}	5.8	-0.3	-1.0	19.9 ^{***}	-2.5	16.0 ^{***}	-0.8			
Pakistan	Specific	6.1 [*]	3.6	4.1	-6.9	-5.2	-3.7	-7.0	-7.5	-10.9 ^{**}	-0.8	33.1 ^{***}	-6.5 [*]	-6.5	0.8			
Indonesia	Diffuse	-1.2	4.8	4.1	-3.4	-4.2 [*]	-3.4	-5.1	-7.0 [*]	-7.3 ^{***}	-0.6	18.1 ^{***}	-3.2	7.9 ^{***}	-3.8 ^{***}			
Indonesia	Specific	1.1	21.4 ^{***}	-4.2	-7.1 [*]	-1.2	-4.7	1.1	6.0	2.0	-0.4	5.2	-1.4	3.3	-3.3 ^{**}			
Egypt	Diffuse	-0.3	0.8	3.8 ^{**}	-0.6	1.0	0.6	1.3	2.8 ^{***}	2.9 ^{***}	-1.1 ^{**}	1.7	-0.2	-0.6	-2.4 ^{**}			
Egypt	Specific	-2.1 ^{**}	7.1 ^{***}	-1.0	3.3	-1.8	-0.4	3.8	2.3	-0.3	1.0	13.3 ^{***}	2.9	1.1	-2.0 ^{**}			
Jordan	Diffuse	2.9 [*]	5.7 ^{***}	4.9	-4.6	-3.3	-3.8	-2.2	3.5	1.6	-1.8	9.7 ^{***}	0.1	0.2	-6.5 ^{***}			
Jordan	Specific	4.2	8.8 ^{***}	6.5 ^{**}	-6.2	-5.5	-5.0	-8.3	-10.8 ^{**}	-4.5	5.5 ^{**}	13.8 ^{***}	-1.4	4.2	-9.0 ^{***}			
Morocco	Diffuse	-2.7	4.4	6.6 ^{***}	-1.6	-5.3 ^{**}	-2.9	-4.7 [*]	-5.3	0.0	3.3 ^{**}	0.9	2.0	0.1	-1.8			
Morocco	Specific	13.6 ^{**}	-14.9 ^{***}	-3.0	-4.6	-3.1	-5.7	-8.0	4.2	13.1 ^{***}	8.2 ^{**}	0.8	1.5	-7.1	3.2			
Nigeria	Diffuse	1.2	-9.4 ^{***}	0.3	0.4	3.2	0.5	0.6	-2.4	-2.8	3.6 ^{**}	6.5 ^{***}	1.4	-4.5	1.5			
Nigeria	Specific	6.7 ^{**}	26.8 ^{***}	11.2 [*]	-10.1 ^{**}	-13.3 ^{***}	-22 ^{***}	-12.4 ^{**}	10.5	7.2 [*]	-2.0	6.7	4.1	-9.3	-4.8 ^{**}			

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significant parameters are shaded. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.

results for specific and diffuse support are reported in Appendix B, and I mainly focus on specific support because of space limitations.

The different signs and the varying levels of substantive effects across 10 countries demonstrate that context (in this case the variation in social, economic, and traditional features of Islamic countries) makes a difference. Overall, the results of the country regressions again lend very strong support to cultural implications and some support to an economic interpretation of modernization theory. As expected, individual opinions about gender equality have positive and large substantive effects in all countries, with the exceptions of Pakistan (not significant), Morocco, and Nigeria (negative sign). It should be noted that this effect is particularly strong in wealthier countries with high levels of female labor force participation (e.g., Turkey and Bosnia), and this may be further evidence of the attitudinal change following modernization. This finding is particularly interesting when considered in conjunction with the significant and negative coefficient for females. Women are less likely to provide specific (and diffuse) support for democracy in many parts of the Islamic world (i.e., Albania, Bosnia, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Nigeria, and Turkey). It appears that in addition to the objective conditions of inequality, which arguably make women less supportive of democracy (Hoffman, 2004; Jamal, 2006; Tessler, 2002) and hence these societies more authoritarian (Donno & Russett, 2004; Fish, 2002), an attitudinal aspect of gender equality plays a major role in informing support for democracy (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). The effect of tolerance, on the other hand, is less prominent in south Asian countries, whereas in Albania, Morocco, and Nigeria tolerant attitudes change specific support for democracy by 15.4%, 13.6%, and 6.7%, respectively.

As for the economic implications of modernization theory, significant effects for class membership, particularly working class and middle class, are scarce and their substantive effects are generally modest. Middle class membership and working class membership significantly increase diffuse support for democracy in Turkey, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. It is interesting to note that working class and low middle class members are less supportive of democracy compared to the members of the upper class in Morocco. One reason for the lack of significant effects for class membership might be the economic dependence of members of the middle class vis-à-vis the state (particularly in *rentier* states of the Middle East; Bellin, 2002; Kamrava, 2005; Richards & Waterbury, 2008). Perhaps, the divergent modernization paths may be the main reason behind this attitudinal difference across countries. To further support this idea, when the impact of individual perceptions of government on support for democracy is closely examined, this variable

becomes negative in south Asia as well as in Albania (13.3% decrease in specific support) and Bosnia (5.6% decrease in diffuse support). In contrast, citizens of Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and Bosnia (for specific support) are more supportive of democracy if they desire an increased role for government. This difference can be attributed to historical variations such as the importance of state in Turkey, the colonial legacy in Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the former communist rule in Bosnia.

However, there is still good support for some aspects of modernization theory. Lipset (1959) argued that increased education and wealth will create citizens who support political modernization (i.e., favor democracy). Education has the expected positive effect in Turkey, Jordan, Nigeria (for specific support) and Morocco (diffuse support). However, the negative sign for education in Bangladesh and Pakistan is puzzling.

It is also worth mentioning the effect of political trust. In Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Jordan, the effect of this variable makes a difference in both specific and diffuse modes of support (as high as 33% for specific support in Pakistan). Interestingly, political trust is found to be less relevant among Muslims living in Europe (i.e., Bosnia and Turkey). Although one needs to accept the limitations related to this measure, it is clear that a positive association between political trust and support for democracy prevails, particularly in south Asia and to a certain degree in Egypt. Therefore, the results do not completely agree with those of Jamal (2007a, 2007b) as political trust appears to be positively related to support for democracy even in some parts of the Arab world. However, the negative effect of social trust in Egypt and Bosnia confirms the view that this kind of trust may have an instrumental utility across the Muslim world (Jamal & Nooruddin, 2006).

Finally, the evidence in favor of Islamic values approach is scarce. Religiosity does not reach statistical significance in 8 of the 10 countries (for a similar finding, see Hoffman, 2004; Jamal, 2006; Rose, 2002; Tessler, 2002). This finding discredits the incompatibility thesis of Islam and democracy (Huntington, 1999; Kedourie, 1992). It appears that being a devout Muslim is not a particularly good predictor of one's democratic orientation. The effect of political Islamist views is mixed, as an individual who prefers to see pious individuals in public offices is less supportive of democracy in Turkey and Bosnia and is more supportive in Pakistan and Indonesia. Turkey, vehemently secular, is the only country where this variable reaches statistical significance in the negative direction for both specific (4.3%) and diffuse support (13.2%). This may be the result of secularist modernization policies followed in this country. In contrast, the positive and strong effect of political

Islamism on attitudes toward democracy in Pakistan may be the result of orthodox religiosity in this country (Hassan, 2003).

Conclusion¹²

Islam is far from monolithic, and Muslim nations present significant diversity with respect to their religious traditions. Despite this diversity, support for democracy at the individual level is remarkably high, and it appears to be independent of “sectarian” or theological traditions across the Muslim world. The evidence offered here agrees with the past research and shows that religiosity is a poor predictor of democratic attitudes in the Muslim geography (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007; Hoffman, 2004; Jamal, 2006; Tessler, 2002).

If Islamic religiosity fails to account for the variation in support for democracy, then what does? And what factors are more important? My analysis showed that cultural attitudes generated by modernization and education have more explanatory power. However, members of the economic classes created by modernization may not always hold favorable orientations toward democracy when multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 2000), state–society relations (e.g., relations with trade unions; Bellin, 2002; Kamrava, 2005), the consequences of *rentierism*, and the generation of divergent attitudes in the Muslim world are considered. Nonetheless, education and to a great extent the changing cultural values associated with modernization (e.g., tolerance and perceptions of gender equality) make this theory strongly relevant in the realm of attitudes. Attitudes toward gender equality are among the strongest predictors of individual support for democracy in the Islamic world (Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Moghadam, 2003), especially in wealthier and modernized nations.

Although political trust appears to be a positive and important predictor in many parts of the Muslim world including Jordan and Egypt, social trust is not a good indicator in explaining support for democracy. Thus, rather than having a nondemocratic utility (Jamal & Nooruddin, 2006), it may have no utility whatsoever in the Arab and non-Arab countries.

The high levels of support for democracy in Muslim countries with authoritarian regimes, Arab or non-Arab, show that if there was a transition to democracy in these countries, regardless of their Islamic values, the public would mostly be ready for such a regime change. Furthermore, a *bottom-up* approach supporting economic development, education, and female empowerment rather than a *top-down* approach imposing institutions may be more instrumental in fostering and maintaining democratic attitudes in the Muslim world.

Appendix A

Table of Independent Variables and Descriptive Statistics

Specific support: 6.90 (1.14), range = 6

Diffuse support: 8.37 (1.97), range = 9

Religiosity: 5.23 (1.74), range = 8

“Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?” (1 = *never*, 7 = *more than once a week*)

Political Islamism: 4.03 (1.25), range = 4.79

“Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office” (4 = *strongly disagree*, 3 = *disagree*, 2 = *agree*, 1 = *strongly agree*).

Perception of government: 6.56 (2.96), range = 10.33

“Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale (1–10)?”

“People should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” (1).

“The government should take more responsibility to provide for themselves” (10).

Perception of class membership (dummy variables)

“People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: 1. upper class, 2. upper middle class, 3. lower middle class, 4. working class, 5. lower class?”

Interpersonal trust: 0.29 (0.45), range = dummy variable

“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”

(0 = *need to be very careful*, 1 = *most people can be trusted*)

Political trust (index of four items): 10.16 (3.04), range = 13.34

“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: Is it a great deal of confidence (4), quite a lot of confidence (3), not very much confidence (2), or none at all (1)? The government in your capital, political parties, parliament, the civil service.”

Social tolerance (index of two items): 1.27 (0.81), range = 2

“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors? (0 = *do not want to see*, 1 = *would like to see one group*, 2 = *I would like to see both groups*): people of a different race, immigrants/foreign workers.”

Perceptions of gender equality (an index of the following items, all items range between 1 and 4; the items were reversed based on the wording to create an index of negative to positive perceptions): 6.40 (1.97), range = 9.51

“Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” (*strongly agree*, *agree*, *disagree*, *strongly disagree*)

“When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than a woman.”

“On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.”

“A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.”

Note: For each variable, the first number is the imputed mean and the number in parentheses is the standard error. A list of all variables and descriptive statistics for imputed and nonimputed values can be found on the author’s webpage.

Appendix B1

Regression Estimates of Diffuse Support for Democracy

	Albania	Bangladesh	Bosnia	Indonesia	Jordan	Morocco	Nigeria	Pakistan	Turkey	Egypt
Modernization										
Tolerance	0.338 ^{***} (0.070)	-0.086 ^{***} (0.030)	0.071 (0.092)	-0.036 (0.044)	0.096* (0.050)	-0.102 (0.088)	0.036 (0.055)	-0.140* (0.073)	0.100 ^{***} (0.029)	-0.011 (0.021)
Perceptions of gender equality	0.063 ^{***}	0.013	0.005	0.037	0.046 ^{**}	0.037	-0.073 ^{***}	-0.011	0.054 ^{***}	0.007
Education	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Lower class	0.028	0.034 ^{***}	0.024	0.035	0.046 ^{***}	0.069 ^{***}	0.003	-0.063 ^{***}	0.057 ^{***}	0.039 ^{***}
Low-middle class	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.008)
Upper-middle class	-0.306	-0.073	-0.481	-0.209	-0.308	-0.120	0.027	0.718 ^{***}	0.337 ^{***}	-0.040
	(0.234)	(0.156)	(0.439)	(0.213)	(0.298)	(0.187)	(0.174)	(0.266)	(0.131)	(0.098)
	-0.188	0.119	-0.144	-0.268*	-0.228	-0.401 ^{**}	0.200	0.553 ^{***}	0.291 ^{**}	0.069
	(0.217)	(0.137)	(0.387)	(0.156)	(0.275)	(0.174)	(0.168)	(0.229)	(0.115)	(0.090)
	0.007	0.053	-0.268	-0.215	-0.259	-0.219	0.033	0.487 ^{**}	0.252 ^{**}	0.042
Working class	(0.267)	(0.134)	(0.391)	(0.172)	(0.278)	(0.204)	(0.197)	(0.235)	(0.117)	(0.095)
Income	-0.147	0.055	-0.072	-0.317	-0.148	-0.356*	0.037	0.505 ^{***}	0.327 ^{***}	0.093
Perceptions of government	(0.218)	(0.165)	(0.386)	(0.213)	(0.282)	(0.183)	(0.190)	(0.249)	(0.118)	(0.096)
	0.001	0.027	-0.051	-0.050*	0.026	-0.040	-0.017	0.042	-0.020	0.023 ^{***}
	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.040)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.017)	(0.008)
	-0.012	-0.048 ^{***}	-0.044 ^{**}	-0.052 ^{***}	0.010	0.000	-0.020	-0.002	0.017 ^{**}	0.023 ^{***}
	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.006)

(continued)

Appendix B1 (continued)

	Albania	Bangladesh	Bosnia	Indonesia	Jordan	Morocco	Nigeria	Pakistan	Turkey	Egypt
Social capital										
Interpersonal trust	-0.032 (0.103)	0.067 (0.058)	-0.115 (0.146)	-0.039 (0.077)	-0.124 (0.077)	0.244*** (0.077)	0.225** (0.085)	-0.071 (0.085)	0.148*** (0.007)	-0.083*** (0.035)
Political trust	0.000 (0.017)	0.081*** (0.011)	0.017 (0.020)	0.086*** (0.018)	0.048*** (0.012)	0.005 (0.015)	0.033*** (0.013)	0.098*** (0.019)	0.000 (0.007)	0.010 (0.006)
Religious values										
Religiosity	0.001 (0.028)	0.011 (0.011)	0.072** (0.031)	-0.034 (0.022)	0.001 (0.029)	0.021 (0.024)	0.010 (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	0.000 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.012)
Political Islamism	-0.016 (0.039)	-0.081*** (0.021)	0.013 (0.049)	0.102*** (0.039)	0.004 (0.026)	0.002 (0.033)	-0.061 (0.044)	0.234*** (0.069)	-0.069*** (0.018)	-0.011 (0.016)
Control variables										
Female	-0.106 (0.094)	0.006 (0.052)	-0.036 (0.106)	-0.242*** (0.081)	-0.453*** (0.084)	-0.134 (0.095)	0.095 (0.093)	-0.055 (0.082)	-0.052 (0.048)	-0.158*** (0.037)
Age	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)
Satisfaction with finances	0.016 (0.024)	-0.060*** (0.011)	0.062** (0.026)	0.024 (0.019)	0.011 (0.016)	0.000 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.018)	0.080*** (0.030)	0.016 (0.010)	0.000 (0.005)
Constant	6.439*** (0.434)	6.867*** (0.288)	6.326*** (0.606)	5.375*** (0.418)	5.832*** (0.443)	7.454*** (0.439)	6.571*** (0.463)	4.491*** (0.589)	5.435*** (0.217)	6.704*** (0.191)
Observations	518	1,296	442	779	931	608	625	1,259	2,955	2,600
R ²	.10	.13	.06	.09	.07	.07	.06	.05	.06	.04

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significant parameters are shaded.
 *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.

Appendix B2

Regression Estimates of Specific Support for Democracy

	Albania	Bangladesh	Bosnia	Indonesia	Jordan	Morocco	Nigeria	Pakistan	Turkey	Egypt
Modernization										
Tolerance	0.605*** (0.134)	-0.086 (0.055)	0.174 (0.158)	0.046 (0.070)	0.174 (0.106)	0.496* (0.266)	0.222** (0.111)	0.232** (0.128)	0.062 (0.047)	-0.093** (0.046)
Perceptions of gender equality	0.325***	0.177***	0.322***	0.207***	0.088**	-0.151**	0.208***	0.035	0.036*	0.078***
Education	0.048 (0.033)	0.023 (0.020)	0.045 (0.052)	0.037 (0.034)	0.043 (0.035)	0.072 (0.055)	0.044 (0.043)	0.041 (0.040)	0.020 (0.019)	0.026 (0.018)
Lower class	0.034 (0.467)	0.492* (0.277)	1.253 (0.778)	-0.617* (0.343)	-0.531 (0.633)	-0.381 (0.595)	-0.739** (0.357)	-0.553 (0.429)	0.251 (0.209)	0.296 (0.231)
Low-middle class	-0.449 (0.431)	0.615** (0.239)	1.136 (0.698)	-0.105 (0.258)	-0.480 (0.582)	-0.256 (0.545)	-0.960*** (0.347)	-0.425 (0.369)	-0.076 (0.183)	-0.164 (0.215)
Upper-middle class	0.392 (0.510)	0.072 (0.231)	0.958 (0.706)	-0.406 (0.282)	-0.424 (0.588)	-0.468 (0.604)	-1.558*** (0.403)	-0.295 (0.383)	-0.034 (0.186)	-0.040 (0.222)
Working class	-0.452 (0.435)	0.741*** (0.286)	1.091 (0.695)	0.093 (0.347)	-0.713 (0.598)	-0.667 (0.590)	-0.884** (0.390)	-0.571 (0.405)	0.008 (0.188)	0.334 (0.225)
Income	0.222*** (0.056)	0.122*** (0.033)	0.117* (0.069)	0.056 (0.043)	-0.104** (0.042)	0.033 (0.072)	0.078 (0.049)	-0.069 (0.072)	0.018 (0.027)	0.022 (0.018)
Perceptions of government	-0.142*** (0.029)	-0.003 (0.013)	0.083*** (0.033)	0.019 (0.020)	-0.038 (0.026)	0.108*** (0.035)	0.053* (0.030)	-0.101** (0.040)	0.008 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.013)

(continued)

Appendix B2 (continued)

	Albania	Bangladesh	Bosnia	Indonesia	Jordan	Morocco	Nigeria	Pakistan	Turkey	Egypt
Social capital										
Interpersonal trust	-0.218 (0.205)	-0.145 (0.107)	-0.467* (0.248)	-0.034 (0.123)	0.455*** (0.162)	0.653*** (0.274)	-0.144 (0.192)	-0.063 (0.146)	0.145 (0.088)	0.088 (0.076)
Political trust	0.058* (0.033)	0.059*** (0.019)	0.009 (0.034)	0.037 (0.028)	0.084*** (0.026)	0.006 (0.041)	0.038 (0.025)	0.183*** (0.030)	0.015 (0.011)	0.091*** (0.014)
Religious values										
Religiosity	0.021 (0.054)	-0.001 (0.020)	0.043 (0.053)	-0.020 (0.036)	-0.016 (0.061)	0.018 (0.065)	0.035 (0.063)	-0.109* (0.057)	-0.015 (0.023)	0.034 (0.026)
Political islamism	0.003 (0.075)	0.033 (0.038)	-0.341*** (0.082)	0.061 (0.064)	0.079 (0.055)	-0.127 (0.087)	-0.146 (0.091)	-0.139 (0.124)	-0.261*** (0.028)	0.024 (0.034)
Control variables										
Female	-0.464** (0.180)	-0.112 (0.093)	-0.127 (0.177)	-0.288*** (0.130)	-0.794*** (0.178)	0.259 (0.270)	-0.347* (0.189)	0.067 (0.137)	-0.187** (0.077)	-0.176** (0.079)
Age	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.007 (0.006)	0.011** (0.005)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.011)	0.010 (0.008)	0.007 (0.006)	0.005* (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)
Satisfaction with finances	-0.143*** (0.048)	-0.069*** (0.020)	-0.076* (0.043)	0.015 (0.030)	0.012 (0.033)	-0.062 (0.052)	-0.000 (0.037)	0.151*** (0.052)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.016 (0.011)
Constant	6.126*** (0.882)	7.048*** (1.049)	4.224*** (1.049)	6.146*** (0.683)	7.318*** (0.940)	8.546*** (1.263)	5.187*** (0.942)	7.746*** (0.987)	7.903*** (0.349)	6.973*** (0.425)
Observations	464	1,184	440	840	924	372	605	773	2,876	2,420
R ²	.28	.09	.21	.07	.06	.10	.10	.09	.06	.05

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significant parameters are shaded.

*Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.

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Notes

1. Some students of Islam and democracy have argued that even controlling for the level of economic development and religion, Islamic countries are less democratic (Fish, 2002). Donno and Russett (2004) accept parts of this argument but challenge the causal link by pointing to an Arab exceptionalism. Ross (2008), on the other hand, puts the blame on oil rather than the Islamic tradition in regard to the women's depression in the Muslim world.
2. A group of scholars take a Weberian approach to argue that Islam (or certain faiths for that matter) and democracy are mutually exclusive and that the most important features of liberal democracy are foreign to Islamic thinking (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1999; Kedourie, 1992; Kim, 1997; Lipset, 1994). Some scholars have criticized this pejorative understanding of Islam by providing a doctrinal argument incorporating concepts such as *ijtihad* (informed rational judgment), *ijma* (consensus), and *shura* (consultation) to show that the two concepts are compatible (Esposito & Voll, 1996; Hefner, 2000; Khan, 2005).
3. Within these countries, only those who identified themselves as Muslims are included. Iran was excluded because of the lack of some key variables employed in the analysis.
4. The Human Development Index is the normalized measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, standard of living, and GDP per capita, and it rank orders countries from highest to lowest based on their score.
5. To capture multiple dimensions of attitudes (for independent and dependent variables), I used indices where more than one item was available. Factor analysis was used to confirm which items best fit these indices. In all factor analyses conducted, any item with a factor loading greater than .50 on the underlying dimension was retained to construct the relevant index.

6. All five items have a 4-point scale ranging from *strongly agree* to *strongly disagree* (the last item has the same scale with response categories ranging from *very bad* to *very good*). The response categories were ordered from negative to positive.
7. According to Easton (1965, p. 437), diffuse support is a general evaluation of the system and represents the long-term attachments to certain political objects, whereas specific support refers to an immediate, short-term evaluation related to the output produced by an object of a political system.
8. The analysis was also conducted using the nonimputed samples. Although there are some minor differences, the results generally hold. These results are available on request.
9. One problem related to this technique is the imputation of nonsensical (e.g., negative income) values or numbers that fall out of the range of the response scale. The results were carefully checked after imputation, and the amount of nonsensical values was not significant. For some variables (e.g., income), negative values were replaced with zero. Because the number of negative values does not exceed 35 cases in the most extreme case, the replacement should not affect the estimation results. No imputation was carried for dependent variables.
10. I report the results for both specific and diffuse support but focus on the interpretation of former because of space limitations. I draw references to diffuse support when the results disagree.
11. To control for this, I also ran the cross-sectional and country regressions without “political trust,” and the results did not change. In addition, political trust is not strongly correlated with the dependent variables in the pooled and country-specific samples. The pooled model is weighted.
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