

**Globalization, Contact, and Religious Identity: A cross-national Analysis of Interreligious Favorability**

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**Forthcoming in Social Science Quarterly**

Please check <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ssqu.12221/abstract> for the final publication copy

## **Introduction**

Scriptures of major world religions promote tolerance and love of the fellow human beings. This stands in sharp contrast to the resurgence of religious intolerance in the global age. Whether it is Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, or anti-Christian views, unfavorable views of the religious other have been on the rise in a globalized world. This study examines the determinants of interreligious favorability and aims to answer the following questions: What explains negative sentiments about religious out-groups cross-nationally? What role, if any, does religious belonging play in shaping these views? Does increased global contact make individuals more favorable of other religious groups?

We develop an interdisciplinary explanation utilizing insights from scholarships in political tolerance, psychology of religious belonging, and social contact to explain the unfavorable views of religious out-groups across the globe. Studies of political tolerance persistently demonstrate that religiosity is linked to political intolerance (Nunn, Crockett, and Williams, 1978; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, 1982; McCloskey and Brill, 1983; Gibson, 2010; but see Eisenstein, 2006). In a similar vein, social and political psychologists argue that religious identity can be a powerful cognitive anchor embedded in a system of truth and infallible guiding principles and may generate unfavorable views toward the religious other (Kinnvall, 2004; Juergensmeyer, 2008; Ysseldyk et al., 2010). However, it is also known that meaningful social contact may inhibit prejudice about out-groups to promote racial (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2000) and religious tolerance (Putnam and Campbell, 2012; Campbell, Green and Monson, 2012).

Building on these studies, we specify two mechanisms that link globalization, contact, and religious identity to attitudes toward the religious other. First, globalization increases the salience of religious identity and facilitates the demarcation of individuals in terms of in-group versus out-group belonging. Second, globalization increases contact among the followers of world's major religions thanks to the increased movement of people across borders and the new communication technologies. We argue that holding exclusive religious identity may undermine interreligious favorability whereas global contact is likely to inhibit unfavorable views toward the religious out-groups. To test these hypotheses, we use the Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2011) including about 20,000 respondents from 20 countries around the world. In addition to developing a new theoretical framework about the effects of religious identity and social contact on individual views toward the religious other, this study also presents the first systematic cross-national analysis of religious out-group attitudes.

In the next section, we provide a brief review of scholarship on religion and tolerance. Then, we examine how globalization makes religion a salient anchor for social identity and at the same time increases opportunities for interreligious contact. After introducing the data and the variables, we run a series of multilevel and logistic regression models to test our hypotheses about unfavorable views toward the members of world's major faiths (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism). The results confirm that holding exclusive religious identity reduces interreligious favorability whereas

the level of globalization and contact with religious minorities increase tolerant views of the religious other. The net effect of contact on interreligious favorability is most visible in countries with high levels of globalization. We also found some evidence about the conditional effect of globalization and the size of religious minorities on interreligious favorability. *Ceteris paribus*, an average individual who considers the members of out-groups as a threat or who holds exclusive religious identity becomes less likely to view the religious other in unfavorable terms as the level of globalization and the size of religious minorities increase. We conclude the paper by discussing the implications of these findings in the context of rising religiosity and religious intolerance in a globalized world.

## **Religion and Tolerance**

Scholarship on religious racism finds that, on average, religious people are more intolerant, racist, and homophobic than their non-religious counterparts (Allport and Ross, 1967; Herek, 1987; Hall et al., 2010). Similarly, students of American politics show that religiosity is a robust determinant of political intolerance (Stouffer, 1955; Nunn et al., 1978; Sullivan et al., 1982; Gibson, 2010). This finding introduces an interesting puzzle as the scriptures of major religions promote tolerance and love of the fellow human beings. To solve this puzzle, a considerable deal of attention has been focused on how different dimensions of religion (“the 3Bs” - belief, belonging, behavior) are linked to political intolerance (Kellstedt et al., 1996; see Burge (2013) and Eisenstein (2008) for two excellent reviews). Some scholars argue that members of only certain denominations are politically intolerant in the US (Nunn et al., 1978; Beatty and Walters., 1984; Gay & Ellison, 1993) while others explain religious intolerance by strict beliefs - e.g. biblical literalism (Wilcox and Jelen, 1990; Green et al., 1994) or religious convictions (Gibson, 2010).

Since the focus on denominations in the US makes it harder to generalize to other cases, some scholars have chosen to focus on general theoretical underpinnings of political tolerance. For example, utilizing liberal democratic theory, Gibson argues that stigmatization of minorities can cause a general “silence,” further increasing intolerance (Gibson, 2010). Employing social identity theory, Gibson and Gouws (2000) find that attitudes toward group solidarity predict intolerance better than group membership in South Africa. Others find that social capital/membership in various groups can increase tolerance, as it creates norms of reciprocity and increases a need for compromise and respect for the other (Cigler and Joslyn, 2002).

To solve the stated puzzle, students of social psychology (Allport and Ross, 1967) differentiate between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity where the former refers to the experience of religion as an end itself and the latter to the utilization of religion as a source of security and status. According to this approach, only extrinsically religious people are more prejudiced toward out-groups. However, controlling for additional factors, some students of political tolerance do not find supportive evidence about this negative relationship (Gaddy, 2003; Eisenstein, 2006; Eisenstein and Clark, 2014). Marie Eisenstein, for example, criticizes the existing models and methodologies for being too

simplistic. Using structural equation modeling, she finds no direct link between religiosity and political intolerance, but rather a link between religious commitment and doctrinal orthodoxy on threat perception (Eisenstein, 2006)<sup>1</sup>, which then increases intolerance toward the perceived out-groups (Gibson, 2010; Haas and Cunningham, 2014).

Overall, there is considerable evidence supporting the link between various forms of religiosity and intolerance, but there are also critical accounts of this proposed relationship. While this research focuses on religiosity, identity, and threat perceptions as determinants of interreligious favorability, or its lack thereof, most studies, with few exceptions (Gibson and Gouws, 2000; Verkuyten et al., 2014), pertain to the American case. As globalization increases contact among members of world's major religions, it becomes imperative to cross-nationally examine how religion inspires or inhibits favorable views toward religious out-groups. In the next section, we explain how religion and contact may inform individual perceptions toward the religious other in a globalized world and we propose several hypotheses.

## **Hypotheses**

Globalization has facilitated the movement of not only goods and people but also ideas by reducing the transaction costs (Hollingsworth, 1998; Manners, 2000). This process has introduced many new economic opportunities along with big social transformations (Therborn, 2000; Mander and Goldsmith, 2001). There are two mechanisms through which globalization processes may shape individual views about the religious out-groups. First, globalization increases the salience of religious identity that may pit social groups against each other to generate unfavorable views of the religious other. Second, globalization creates new opportunities for social contact and this is likely to facilitate interreligious favorability. We explain both mechanisms below.

The global rise of religiosity can partly be attributed to a general fear of existential security emanating from the uncertain conditions accompanying globalization (Juergensmeyer, 2005; Kinnvall, 2004). While national identity continues to be an important part of individuals' self in this context, religion, as an idealized/sacred collection of guiding principles and as a shared group worldview involving affection and strong moral authority (Ysseldyk et al., 2010; Kinnvall, 2004; Stark, 2001), becomes a powerful cognitive anchor providing a feeling of security. However, in a setting where interreligious contact is frequent and not necessarily always meaningful, the psychological security of religious belonging may gain salience at the expense of religious intolerance. Although, religious participation and religious orthodoxy may also affect the perceptions of religious out-groups (Burge, 2013), we argue that globalization has increased the salience of symbolic attachments (e.g. religious identity) in shaping individual attitudes in relation to the other dimensions of religion.

Religion can play an important role in identity construction in both secular nation-states (Brubaker, 2012; Voicu, 2012; Van der Veer, 1994) and in settings where religion and the state are very much intertwined (Friedland,

2001). As Juergensmeyer argues (2005: 8), “the crucial problems in an era of globalization are identity and control. The two are linked, in that a loss of a sense of belonging leads to a feeling of powerlessness. What has been perceived as a loss of faith in secular nationalism may be experienced as a loss of agency. For these reasons, the assertion of traditional forms of religious and ethnic identities is linked to attempts to reclaim personal and cultural power.” In a similar vein, Kinnvall (2004) asserts that globalization deteriorates old identities and their protective aura to increase the need for psychological security. While this conclusion echoes the findings of political tolerance scholars highlighting the intermediary role of threat perceptions in creating intolerance (Eisenstein, 2006; Eisenstein and Clark, 2014; Gibson, 2001), Kinnvall builds on the work of Kristeva (1982) who argues that in order to securitize subjectivity, we create an “Other” and fill this concept with hatred. Consequently, the temporal durability of religion makes it an important anchor in a changing world through creation and maintenance of traumas (Kinnvall, 2004).

While religious identity gains prominence in shaping individuals’ worldviews in the global age, it is hardly the only or the most significant form of belonging. Religious attachment may be a type of identity in itself when individuals accept it as a primary group belonging or it may overlap with other identity categories. Proponents of social identity theory argue that social group membership forms the basis of a positive self-identity leading people to compare their own groups (in-group) to the out-groups where the evaluations of the former are generally positive and those of the latter are negative (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981; Brewer, 1999). It is evident that those who define their identities in relation to religion will be more likely to hold negative views about the members of other faiths. Religion as a unique social identity category gains prominence to the extent that “religious identification offers a distinctive ‘sacred’ worldview and ‘eternal’ group membership unmatched by identification with other social groups” (Ysseldyk et al., 2010). One can argue that a similar dynamic is in order for national identity as well. However, the power of religious identity comes from its unique ideological position carrying affection and moral authority that emanates from a truth claim (Stark, 2001; Kinnvall, 2004) or through the cognitive processing of shared memories bound to create in-group cohesion (Whitehouse, 2004).<sup>2</sup> The perception that one’s own religion is the correct set of guiding principles to follow generates a psychology of in-group superiority (Roccas et al., 2006) or de-humanization of the other (Waller, 2002). Therefore, religious identity, through these processes, is very likely to inform unfavorable views of the religious other. Furthermore, religious identity may help individuals to make sense of complex issues. Political scientists found that group based attitudes provide cognitive structures which help individuals simplify the political world (Wald et al., 1989; Brady and Sniderman, 1985; Wilcox, 1987; Jelen, 1993; Hayes, 1995). Thus, religious identity will be instrumental in helping people to make sense of complex globalization processes and consequences of increased visibility of religious out-groups.

Overall, one can expect that individuals with strong nationalist and religious attachments will hold negative sentiments toward the religious other. However, with its unique ideological and psychological characteristics, religious

identity could be a more salient factor explaining negative religious out-group attitudes compared to national identity in the global era. Based on the above discussion we generate the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Individuals who hold religious identity as their primary attachment will be negatively oriented toward the religious other.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals who hold both religious and national identity as their primary attachment will be negatively oriented toward the religious other.

Hypothesis 3: Individuals who hold religious identity as their primary attachment will be more strongly inclined to hold unfavorable views of religious other than those who hold only national identity or are equally attached to both religious and national identity.

Social contact provides a second mechanism through which globalization may exert an effect on interreligious favorability. According to Allport (1954), under certain conditions, interpersonal contact may help reduce prejudice against minority groups. Contact will increase tolerance if those who interact have equal status, have common goals, have a supportive normative/institutional environment, and engage in personal interaction over a period of time (Allport 1954 Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Recent scholarship has found that friendship and interaction among family members make “meaningful contact” possible and hence reduce prejudice toward out-groups (Pettigrew and Trop, 2000). As Putnam and Campbell (2012) succinctly put it in the *American Grace*, despite growing polarization between religious conservatives and non-religious liberals, American society resiliently remains tolerant toward the religious other. They explain this tendency by meaningful interaction thanks to social ties that connect the members of different denomination in non-religious sphere (i.e. bridging).

Globalization processes have made interreligious contact more frequent in both physical and symbolic sense. The movement of people, increased stocks of immigrants (Lucas, 2008), and the ease of cultural interactions thanks to the new technologies generate frequent interreligious contact. Not only movies and television, but also the Internet revolution and the social media are some of the means of these frequent interactions, dubbed as “electronic contact” (Amichai-Hamburger and McKenna, 2006), among world citizens. While this new form of contact is mostly indirect, there is also some evidence demonstrating that both direct and indirect contact with minority ethnic and religious groups will decrease prejudice toward out-groups (Pettigrew et al., 2007). This discussion leads us to a hypothesis that consists of two parts.

Hypothesis 4a: High level of globalization is likely to decrease negative sentiments toward the religious other.

Contact hypothesis relies on the idea that increased personal interaction and high levels of meaningful knowledge of out-groups will reduce prejudice against the members of these groups. However, as Campbell et al. (2012) have demonstrated in a recent study, this linear logic is problematic in the American context. They find that in addition to the existing prejudice due to the insulated status of Mormons as a religious out-group, those who have moderate contact with this group were more responsive to either positive or negative political messages about Mitt Romney's presidential candidacy in 2008 than those with little or very high levels of contact. While contact opportunities have increased in the global era, social interaction is not personal and close enough to offset the stereotypes about religious out-groups. A recent cross-national study found that globalization increases prejudice toward immigrants (Kaya and Karakoc, 2012). Likewise, globalization may fuel negative sentiments toward the members of other religions.

Hypothesis 4b: High level of globalization is likely to increase negative sentiments toward the religious other.

The increased movement of people across borders introduces an additional mechanism for new global social contact. As a large number of people migrate and settle in other countries, particularly to the Western societies, the composition of the population changes and religious minorities become more visible. For example, the population of Muslims in Western societies has been increasing exponentially. These shifts in demographics may overwhelm the natives and create a feeling of threat but at the same time they may generate new opportunities for meaningful social contact. According to the racial threat theory (Blalock, 1967) increased visibility of minorities leads to discriminatory practices and threat-oriented ideologies carried by the members of the majority group.<sup>3</sup> An increase in the size of out-group membership may generate a feeling of threat against the in-group values among the locals. Such threat perceptions are also likely to apply to religious group attitudes (Campbell, 2006). Some scholars find that an increase in the size of ethnic minority groups creates opportunities for frequent interaction and reduces prejudice against out-groups (Wagner et al., 2007). However, largely due to the perceived economic threats by the members of the majority group, the size of minority groups is likely to increase prejudice (Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2006). Members of non-hegemonic religions, who become more visible thanks to their increased interactions with the dominant religious group as a result of globalization processes (e.g. mass immigration, communications, advances in digital technologies), may be perceived as a threat to the economic and social order. This kind of threat perception is more likely to be symbolic as demonstrated by E. Campbell (2003) in his study of contact and xenophobic attitudes in Botswana. Thus, we can suggest:<sup>4</sup>

Hypothesis 5: Individuals who perceive threats from other religious groups are more likely to hold negative views toward the religious other than those who do not perceive threats from other religious groups.

Hypothesis 6: An increase in the size of religious minorities is likely to increase unfavorable attitudes toward the religious other.

### **Data and Variables**

We use the Pew Global Attitudes Survey (Spring 2011) to examine negative sentiments toward the religious other for world's major religions (anti-Christian, anti-Muslim, and anti-Jewish sentiments) in a selected sample of 20 countries. Despite some limitations, these surveys allow testing of the proposed effects of globalization, contact, and religious identity on religious out-group attitudes across the globe. We first run a series of multi-level models to account for the cross-national variation and random effects. Then we split countries into three different groups according to the majority religion and run fixed-effects models in sub-samples to predict attitudes toward the religious other (Christian, Muslim, or Jew).<sup>5</sup> The dataset includes Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey from Muslim majority countries as well as Brazil, Britain, France, Germany, Kenya, Lithuania, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, and the United States from Christian majority countries. Other countries in the sample are Israel (Jewish majority), India (Hindu majority), and Lebanon with equal Muslim and Christian majority populations. We exclude China, Palestine, and Japan from our sample, because the main questions we use in the analysis are not asked in these countries. In all countries, representative national samples were drawn with multi-stage clustered sampling.

Before estimating each model, we filter the respondents who belong to the religion that is the target of negative sentiments to create a general measure of attitudes toward the religious other. For example, in Muslim majority countries, we capture the perceptions about Christians and Jews. Similarly, in Christian majority countries the perceptions about Muslims and Jews are the focus of our analysis. We pay special attention to India, Israel, and Lebanon<sup>6</sup> by filtering the respondents according to their religious denominations and include them in appropriate models. The main dependent variable measures the unfavorable views about the members of other religions. The Pew Global Attitude Survey (2011) includes the following question about unfavorable views of the religious other:

“Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of (OUT-GROUP)?”<sup>7</sup>

For multilevel estimation, we created an index combining the responses about the religious out-groups (e.g. unfavorable views of Christians and Jews among Muslims). This index can take twelve different values and since it calculates the mean score for each respondent it ranges from 1 (favorable) to 4 (unfavorable views). For fixed-effects models, we created a dichotomous variable to capture anti-Christian, anti-Muslim, and anti-Jewish views. This variable takes a value of 1 for ‘somewhat unfavorable’ or ‘very unfavorable’ responses and 0 otherwise.<sup>8</sup> We dropped the



“Don’t Know” and “Refused”. responses Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents holding negative sentiments toward the religious other in split samples.

Figure 1 About Here

The first panel in Figure 1 shows that anti-Semitic feelings are the highest in Muslim majority countries. About 98 % of the Jordanian respondents voiced unfavorable opinions toward the Jews, whereas the United States has the lowest percentage of respondents with anti-Semitic views. Given the political histories of these countries in relation to Israel, this is hardly a surprising finding. As for anti-Muslim views, 63% of the Lithuanians hold unfavorable opinions of Muslims, while this figure is 29% and 27% in the US and Russia respectively. Britain has the lowest percentage of respondents holding anti-Muslim sentiments. Figure 1 shows that the Turkish respondents expressed the highest percentage of negative sentiments toward the Christians (82%) followed by the Pakistani respondents (64%). Lebanese respondents have the lowest level of anti-Christian sentiments in the entire sample. We use the following item to measure the self-reported social identity:

Do you think of yourself first as (name of survey country’s nationality) or first as a (name of the dominant religion in the survey country)? Name of survey country’s nationality (1), dominant religion (2), both equally (3).

We created dichotomous variables for each of these responses to capture religious, national, and religious-nationalist identity. In the empirical estimations below, we keep national identity as the reference category. Ideally, multiple items measuring the levels and strength of different identity categories would have provided a better assessment of the first three hypotheses. Unfortunately, the Pew Surveys do not include additional items; neither they provide an ideal measure of religious nationalism as defined by Juergensmeyer (1993, 2008). Thus, our measure does not allow us to compare different identities at different levels of strength. However, with the existing measures we can test our hypotheses about the unique effect of religious identity and whether individuals’ exclusive religious identity has stronger effects on religious out-group attitudes compared to the effects of national identity and hybrid identity (both equally) on these views. Overall, the percentage of respondents who identify with exclusive religious identity is higher in the Muslim countries as well as in Israel and the US. Most European countries have higher rates of national attachment, whereas a moderate proportion of respondents describe their identity as “equally based on religion and nation.”

We use the KOF Swiss Economic Institute globalization index incorporating the economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization as of 2010 as our first measure of contact.<sup>9</sup> We also use the percentage of each religious minority in all countries based on the Global Religious Landscape data provided by the Pew Religion and Public Life Project as an additional measure of social contact. For each model, the percentage of religious minority was selected according to the target population (e.g. percentage Muslim used in anti-Muslim sentiment estimations). We use

an item asking the respondents whether they believe other religions are violent or not as a measure of threat perception (1 if members of other religion perceived as violent). We expect that the size of religious minorities and threat perceptions will increase unfavorable views of the religious other. We test both positive and negative contact hypotheses for the proposed effect of globalization on attitudes toward the religious other. Figure 2 shows the relationship between interreligious favorability and the main independent variables using average scores by country. As expected, religious identity increases unfavorable views of the religious other and the level of globalization is more conducive to interreligious favorability based on national averages. The size of religious minority and threat perceptions also appear to decrease unfavorable views of religious out-groups, however, this relationship is not very strong.

Figure 2 Here

We also include additional control variables in our models and report the summary statistics for all variables in Appendix A. Personal religiosity is measured by the frequency of respondents' religious and prayer service attendances. This variable is measured along five, seven, or nine-point scales in different countries. We synchronized this measure with a five point scale ranging from hardly praying and hardly attending religious services (1) to praying five times a day and frequent visitors (5). For responses with seven and nine categories, we combined the lower and upper end responses and kept the middle responses to form a five-point scale in all countries. We use an item tapping respondents' overall opinion of economy ranging from 'economic situation is very good' (1) to 'economic situation is very bad' (4). We utilize a dummy variable for measuring satisfaction with life and this variable takes a value of 1 when a respondent is dissatisfied with her personal life. We expect that individuals who are dissatisfied with their personal life and overall economic conditions will be more likely to hold negative sentiments about the religious other. We also control for the respondents' belief in superiority of own culture (four-point scale), education, gender, age, income, and employment status. These items have different categories across the sample. Therefore, we synchronized the categories to create dichotomous variables measuring high income, middle income, college education, and full-time employment. This was our best way of creating consistent measures to capture the socio-economic background of the respondents.

## Results

Table 1 presents the results of the multilevel model estimations. The first model is the base model and we add the interaction terms between measures of contact and religious identity in Models 2-4. Our results provide strong support for the religious identity hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) and the positive global contact argument (Hypothesis 4a). In all models, exclusive religious identity increases whereas globalization decreases unfavorable views of the religious other. The results do not substantiate a negative relationship between the size of religious minority and unfavorable views of religious out-groups. However, as expected, those who view other religions as violent are more likely to be unfavorable of religious out-groups in Models 1-3 (threat perceptions hypothesis). This variable becomes negative in Model 4 when

it is interacted with indicators of contact (globalization and size of religious minority). Controlling for interaction terms between indicators of contact and identity (Model 2 and Model 3), we still find strong support in favor of the contact and religious identity hypotheses. However, the interaction terms between the size of religious minority and identity variables turn to be positive. As expected, dissatisfaction with life, negative socio-tropic economic expectations, and belief in cultural superiority increases unfavorable views of the religious other. Finally, those with higher levels of education and female respondents are less likely to hold unfavorable views of religious out-groups.

Table 1 Here

We also calculated the marginal effects from Model 1 for indicators of contact and religious identity (Figure 3). The top panel shows that as the level of globalization in a country increases, those who hold exclusive religious identity become less likely to view religious out-groups in unfavorable terms. For example, a British citizen (highest score of globalization) who defines her identity in religious terms would be about 20% less likely to hold unfavorable views of religious out-groups compared to a Kenyan citizen with the same characteristics (lowest score of globalization). A similar conditional impact is also observed for the size of religious minority. As the size of religious out-groups increases, individuals become less likely to hold unfavorable views of the religious other even if they hold exclusive religious identity or view members of other religions as a threat. This second conditional effect, however, is moderate in comparison to the conditional effect of globalization. In our additional analysis (available upon request), we also found that religious identity has a substantively larger effect on intolerant views of the religious other compared to the effects associated with hybrid and national identities. In sum, globalization reverses the positive relationship between religious identity and unfavorable perceptions of religious out-groups to bring about favorable views toward the members of other religions. Therefore, we find strong support for the positive effect of global contact on interreligious favorability cross-nationally.

Figure 3 Here

We continue our analysis by examining the effects of religious identity and global contact on perceptions of specific religious out-groups (Christians, Muslims, and Jews). Since the dependent variable measuring attitudes toward the religious other is dichotomous, we use logistic regression estimation in the following models. For each type of sentiment, we first run a base model and compare this to the fixed effects model using weights in all models. Overall, the results in Table 2 lend strong support to the religious identity and positive contact hypotheses. Holding exclusive religious identity increases whereas both contact and the size of religious minorities decrease unfavorable views of the religious other in all models. While those who identify both with religion and nation are more likely to hold anti-Christian and anti-Jewish sentiments in the base models, this effect remains most robust in predicting the anti-Muslim sentiment. Exclusive religious identity strongly predicts both anti-Christian and anti-Muslim views in the base and fixed-effects models. In multilevel and split sample estimations, we empirically confirm the implications of the studies

theorizing about the salience of religious identity in forming attitudes toward the religious out-groups in the global age (Juergensmeyer, 1993; Kinnvall, 2004; Voicu, 2012; Whitehouse, 2004; Gibson and Gouwas, 2000). Since a significant cross-cultural variation exists in the meaning and strength of these identity categories, we need to exercise caution about these results. However, to the extent that religious identity in itself or in combination with the national attachment becomes one's primary identity, its effect on religious out-group attitudes appears to be stronger than national identity. Furthermore, the results lend strong support to the positive global contact hypothesis showing that even general and indirect forms of contact may reduce interreligious unfavorable perceptions (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew et al., 2007; Putnam and Campbell, 2012; Campbell et al., 2012). While the size of religious minorities is a robust predictor of only the anti-Christian sentiments, we find strong support for the threat perceptions hypothesis in all six models. These results agree with the findings of recent research highlighting the importance of threat perceptions in mitigating the effect of religiosity on political tolerance (Eisenstein, 2006; Eisenstein and Clark, 2014).

Table 2 About Here

Overall, these results confirm that religious identity and global contact carries a significant independent effect after controlling for factors like personal religiosity, perceptions of cultural superiority, education, and other demographic factors. Interestingly, being religious decreases negative sentiments toward the Christians and Muslims, but this impact does not remain robust in explaining negative views toward the Jews. The cross-cultural variation in the patterns and meanings of religious service attendance and prayer may account for this inconsistency. Unfortunately, the Pew surveys do not have additional measures of religious belief and practice and this limitation prevents further investigation. Dissatisfaction with life, belief in one's own cultural superiority, and negative evaluation of general economic conditions increase the dislike of the religious other as expected. Another consistent finding is the statistically significant and negative effect of education on negative sentiments toward the Jews, Christians, and Muslims.

Finally, religious identity categories do not explain the anti-Jewish sentiment when we control for the fixed effects. As we show in Figure 1, anti-Semitism is very high in Muslim societies and in some European countries. The dislike of the Jews may be explained by political factors related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the opposition to the creation of a Jewish state in the Middle East. The unconditional American support for Israel has increased the anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiment in Arab societies (Jamal, 2012) and beyond. Some violent organizations like Al-Qaeda have used these political issues to generate a dislike of Israel, and more broadly, the Jews among Muslim publics. Some Middle Eastern leaders (e.g. Nasser in Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Erdogan in Turkey) have exploited Arab-Israeli conflict to gain domestic political capital and international popularity (Ciftci and Tezcur 2015). The extreme right parties in Europe have also used the anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish rhetoric in their manifestos. Historically, anti-Semitism has been prevalent in a number of countries around the world including Western societies. According to the Pew surveys anti-Jewish sentiments remain at very high levels in Muslim majority countries, but most

European and Christian publics demonstrate lower levels of anti-Semitic attitudes. Relatively more favorable views of the Jews may be attributed to the changing perceptions in the aftermath of the World War II in Europe and support for Israel among the evangelicals in the US.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, deep historical and political reasons may make religious identity less relevant in shaping the anti-Jewish sentiment.

We conclude our analysis by presenting the substantive effects of all variables on dislike of the religious other to compare the magnitudes of the proposed effects. Figure 4 presents the rate of change (predictive margins) associated with each independent variable for Models 6, 8, and 10 in Table 2 with 95% confidence bounds.

Figure 4 Here

According to Figure 4, the substantive effect of globalization is smaller than the effect of exclusive religious identity on negative sentiments toward the religious other. While the effect of hybrid identity (both religious and national) is larger, this marginal effect is statistically relevant in explaining only the anti-Muslim sentiment. The predictive margins of globalization are negative in the models explaining anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish sentiment, but they remain positive (to increase unfavorable views) in the first panel. The largest substantive effect is associated with the threat perceptions whereas marginal effect of education consistently reduces the dislike of religious other. These results provide additional support for the religious identity and global contact hypotheses.<sup>11</sup>

### **Additional Analysis**

We ran additional models to validate our findings. First, we included the interaction terms between measures of contact, identity, and threat perceptions in estimation of specific religious out-group attitudes to expand the analysis presented in Tables 1 and 2. Second, since threat perception is proposed as a mechanism through which religious identity may inform attitudes toward other religious groups, we ran additional models with multiplicative terms of religious identity/religious nationalism and the indicator of threat perceptions. Third, given the high degree of correlation between religious identity and religiosity, we run a series of models excluding religiosity. Fourth, given the weakness of our measure of identity, we created an alternative three-point ordinal variable measuring social identity categories of interest (ranging from national to religious identity) and ran all models with this alternative operationalization. Finally, we estimated additional models with different subsamples. For example, we estimated all models dropping Lebanon and India from the analysis. We also ran models predicting the anti-Jewish and anti-Christian sentiments in Muslim only and the anti-Muslim sentiment in the Christian only sample. By and large, in all of these models, our substantive conclusions about religious identity and global contact hypotheses do not change. Some of these additional analyses are available in our online appendix (corresponding author's website) and all estimation results are available upon request.

## Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to examine the cross-national variation in interreligious favorability across the globe. The theoretical argument focused on two factors that are closely related to globalization: the increasing salience of religious identity and the global contact. Our results show that religious identity, as an individual's primary attachment, is positively related to unfavorable views of the religious other. We contribute to the existing scholarship by empirically confirming the independent role of religious identity and the broader applicability of theories dealing with the increasing salience of religious belonging on a global scale (Juergensmeyer, 2008; Kinnvall, 2004). The robustness of the proposed relationship in predicting unfavorable views of the religious other confirms the findings of the students of political tolerance (Sullivan et al., 1982; Gibson, 2010) as well as of those who argue that with globalization religion has become a salient feature of social and political life in the Middle East (Zubaida, 2012), Western societies (Kinnvall, 2004; Voicu, 2012) or in less developed parts of the world (Juergensmeyer, 1998; Whitehouse, 2004). Our results also show that threat perception is a robust predictor of interreligious non-favorability when we control for globalization and religious identity. Thus, in our analysis, we also find indirect support for the wider applicability of theories linking religiosity to intolerance through mediation of threat perceptions (Eisenstein, 2006).

We find that individuals are more favorable toward the religious out-groups at higher levels of globalization. *Ceteris paribus*, individuals who live in a highly globalized society are less likely to hold unfavorable views of the religious other than those who reside in a less globalized society. Therefore, global contact, albeit indirect and less meaningful, has a potential for generating favorable views toward the religious other on a global scale. This result supports the findings of the contact theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) and the recent scholarship on contact and religious tolerance in the US (Putnam and Campbell, 2012; Campbell et al., 2012). Accordingly, our analysis allows us to make a second contribution by demonstrating the cross-national relevance of contact theory with respect to the religious out-group attitudes. We take one step further and demonstrate that the positive effect of globalization through contact also offsets the negative effects of religious belonging and the threat perceptions on interreligious favorability. A similar pattern is observed with respect to our second measure of contact: the size of a religious minority. Individuals who live in a highly globalized society with a relatively large religious minority are less likely to hold unfavorable views toward the religious out-groups even if they hold exclusive religious identity and perceive a general threat from other groups. Globalization increases the salience of religious identity and that may be more conducive to interreligious intolerance. However, globalization also provides new opportunities for social interaction that may reverse the negative effect of religious identity on interreligious non-favorability.

Unavoidably, there are certain limitations of this analysis that hopefully will motivate future studies. Although the Pew Global Attitudes Survey provides a large number of items asked in a wide array of countries, it does not allow the direct testing of theories about religious tolerance and contact. We only relied on indirect measures, interreligious

favorability and global contact, in our analysis. Scholars could collect new data to carry a direct test of contact and religious tolerance hypotheses on a global scale. Second, we cannot make a causal claim about the direct effect of globalization and contact on religious out-group views. Future experimental studies can manipulate the causal factors (forms of global social contact and perceived threat) in settings with different religious institutions, varying levels of globalization, and different sizes of religious minorities to account for the causality. Finally, our analysis only examines interreligious favorability toward the members of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. Future studies could expand the scope of this research by examining the religious out-group views about Buddhism, Hinduism, and other faiths.

Globalization has increased the salience of religious identity that can be a source of prejudice toward the members of other religions. Unfortunately, this process leads to less understanding among religious communities and this may justify religious violence among the adherents of the world's major faiths. However, globalization also makes contact more likely to offset this negative impact. Therefore, in a world where people have more opportunities to interact, religious tolerance could overtake prejudice and inhibit the religiously justified violence.

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1 Eisenstein (2006) links psychological security, which is comprised of dogmatism, self-esteem and social trust, to intolerance. In rather surprising findings, she argues that social trust, the factor least linked to religiosity, affects intolerance the most, while dogmatism has a minor effect and self-esteem has no discernable effect (Eisenstein and Clark, 2014).

2 In a more elaborate account, Whitehouse (2004) defines religiosity as an analytical category where different modes of religiosity, “doctrinal” and “imagistic”, are related to episodic memory (unique personal events) and semantic memory (general) respectively. Representations of religious identity encoded in semantic memory produce imagined religious communities whereas unique, life changing events (episodic memory) feeds an “imagistic” mode of religiosity forming “enduring and particularistic social bonds” (Whitehouse, 2004: 2).

3 Perceived threat can have two forms: realistic threat and symbolic threat. The former concerns the perceived threats to the physical and material well-being of in-group (Sherif, 1966). The latter, symbolic threat is derived from symbolic racism theory (Sears et al., 1980; Kinder and Sears, 1981) and its proponents argue that people are worried about national unity or cultural values more than they are about economic wellness.

4 Our theoretical argument also implies interaction between globalization and religious identity, globalization and threat perceptions, and globalization and size of religious minorities. While we do not present these hypotheses due to space limitations, we test them in the models presented below and in the additional analyses that are available upon request.

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5 These sample countries were divided based on the proportion of majority Muslim, Christian, Jewish and Hindu population for the analysis presented below. The data are from ‘The World Fact-Book’ available at the Central Intelligence Agency website at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

6 We also ran the same models dropping Lebanon from the estimation and the results do not change. These results are available upon request.

7 The survey directly asks the respondents their opinions about a number of groups along with the Jews, Christians and Muslims. For details see Q-3 in the Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2011) available at <http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/2011/>. While this question is likely to introduce a response bias based on the context of the interviews, we use weights and include country fixed effects to partially offset this limitation. Additional robust analysis is reported in the online appendix.

8 We prefer to report the logistic regression estimations, because in most ordered logit models the proportional odds assumption does not hold. The results in ordered logit estimations do not differ significantly.

9 Although the measures of contact are not ideal, these measures allow us to test the effect of general contact on attitudes toward the religious other. Details about the Kaufman index can be found at <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch>.

10 See Pat Robertson’s account of this support at <http://www.patrobertson.com/Speeches/IsraelLauder.asp>. When we estimate the anti-Jewish sentiment in Muslim majority countries, religious identity turns to be significant in the expected direction. This result confirms the salience of religion as an identity category in the Muslim world (Zubaida, 2012). This is also in line with Oliver Roy’s (1996) argument about the increasing salience of Islamic identity as a symbolic attachment. The fact that some political Islamists have also exploited anti-Semitic feelings may also account for these results.

<sup>11</sup> We prefer not to report the marginal effects for the size of religious minority as the large substantive effects distort the presentation of the other figures in the model. It should be noted that this marginal effect barely reaches statistical significance in only Model 6 and is not statistically significant in the other models.






Figure 1: Worldwide Attitudes toward the Religious Other

\*The numbers inside the bars represent percent respondents who hold unfavorable views toward the members of target religion (Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 2011).




Figure 2: The Determinants of Interreligious Favorability

\* The figures represent mean or percentage scores (scaled 0-100) for each variable by country. The panels for religious identity and threat perceptions show proportion of respondents who identify themselves by religion and who perceive other religions as violent. BRA=Brazil, BRI=Britain, CHI=China, EGY=Egypt, FRA=France, GER=Germany, IND=India, INDO=Indonesia, ISR=Israel, JAP=Japan, JOR=Jordan, KEN=Kenya, LEB=Lebanon, LIT=Lithuania, MEX=Mexico, PAK=Pakistan, POL=Poland, RUS=Russia, SPA=Spain, TUR=Turkey, UKR=Ukraine, US=United States (source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 2011).




Figure 3: Marginal Effects of Contact, Religion and Perceived Threat on Unfavorable Views of Religious Other.

\*Marginal effects are calculated from the estimations presented in Model 1 (iTable 1, source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 2011).




Figure 4: Predictive Margins

\*Predictive Margins are obtained from Models 6,8, and 10 in Table 2.

Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Unfavorable views of Religious Other	20398	2.71	0.85	1	4
Unfavorable views of Muslims	13415	2.63	0.95	1	4
Unfavorable views of Christians	9757	2.61	1.05	1	4
Unfavorable views of Jews	16759	2.84	1.06	1	4
Exclusive Religious Identity	22433	0.29	0.46	0	1
Religious and National Identity	22433	0.11	0.31	0	1
Globalization Index	22435	65.73	11.73	48.79	85.39
Percent Other Religion	22436	0.12	0.13	0.001	0.384
Percent Christian	22436	0.41	0.38	0.004	0.951
Percent Muslim	22436	0.32	0.39	0.001	0.98
Percent Jewish	22436	0.03	0.15	0.001	0.756
Religiosity	21735	3.21	1.53	1	5
Other Religion Violent	22436	0.40	0.49	0	1
Christians Violent	21787	0.03	0.18	0	1
Muslims Violent	21787	0.26	0.44	0	1
Jews Violent	21787	0.11	0.32	0	1
Belief in Cultural Superiority	21551	2.91	0.97	1	4
Satisfaction with Life	21825	0.67	0.47	0	1
Sociotropic Expectations	22078	2.91	0.95	1	4
Education	22239	0.19	0.39	0	1
Income	20094	2.25	0.69	1	3
Female	22433	0.51	0.50	0	1
Age	22357	40.97	16.39	18	97
Employment Status (Full time)	22353	0.44	0.50	0	1

Table 1: Multilevel Estimation Results for the Unfavorable Views of the Religious Other

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Religious Identity	0.145 <sup>***</sup> (0.014)	0.202 <sup>**</sup> (0.084)	0.0798 <sup>***</sup> (0.019)	0.144 <sup>***</sup> (0.014)
Religious and National Identity	0.052 <sup>***</sup> (0.02)	0.027 (0.125)	0.004 (0.024)	0.051 <sup>**</sup> (0.019)
Globalization Index	-0.020 <sup>***</sup> (0.008)	-0.021 <sup>***</sup> (0.008)	-0.022 <sup>***</sup> (0.008)	-0.023 <sup>***</sup> (0.008)
Percent Other Religion	-0.518 (0.834)	-0.513 (0.834)	-0.705 (0.846)	-0.584 (0.832)
Globalization X Religious Identity		-0.000 (0.001)		
Globalization X Religious and National Identity		0.000 (0.002)		
Percent Other Religion X Religious Identity			0.588 <sup>***</sup> (0.115)	
Percent Other Religion X Religious and National Identity			0.432 <sup>***</sup> (0.154)	
Religiosity	-0.017 <sup>***</sup> (0.004)	-0.016 <sup>***</sup> (0.005)	-0.015 <sup>***</sup> (0.005)	-0.017 <sup>***</sup> (0.004)
Other Religion Violent	0.135 <sup>***</sup> (0.011)	0.135 <sup>***</sup> (0.011)	0.135 <sup>***</sup> (0.011)	-0.170 <sup>**</sup> (0.073)
Globalization X Other Religion Violent				0.004 <sup>***</sup> (0.001)
Percent Other Religion X Other Religion Violent				0.208 <sup>*</sup> (0.093)
Belief in Cultural Superiority	0.028 <sup>***</sup> (0.007)	0.028 <sup>***</sup> (0.007)	0.029 <sup>***</sup> (0.007)	0.027 <sup>***</sup> (0.007)
Satisfaction with Life	0.040 <sup>***</sup> (0.013)	0.040 <sup>***</sup> (0.013)	0.041 <sup>***</sup> (0.013)	0.041 <sup>***</sup> (0.013)
Sociotropic Economic Expectations	0.046 <sup>***</sup> (0.007)	0.046 <sup>***</sup> (0.007)	0.047 <sup>***</sup> (0.007)	0.047 <sup>***</sup> (0.007)
Education	-0.069 <sup>***</sup> (0.015)	-0.069 <sup>***</sup> (0.015)	-0.069 <sup>***</sup> (0.015)	-0.069 <sup>***</sup> (0.015)
Middle Income	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.024 (0.017)	-0.023 (0.017)
High Income	-0.000 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.019)	-0.0004 (0.019)
Female	-0.028 <sup>*</sup> (0.011)	-0.028 <sup>**</sup> (0.011)	-0.027 <sup>**</sup> (0.011)	-0.030 <sup>***</sup> (0.011)
Age	0.001 <sup>***</sup> (0.000)	0.001 <sup>***</sup> (0.000)	0.001 <sup>***</sup> (0.000)	0.002 <sup>***</sup> (0.000)
Employment Status	-0.026 <sup>**</sup> (0.012)	-0.026 <sup>**</sup> (0.012)	-0.026 <sup>**</sup> (0.012)	-0.027 <sup>**</sup> (0.012)
Constant	3.849 <sup>***</sup> (0.556)	3.833 <sup>***</sup> (0.557)	3.890 <sup>***</sup> (0.564)	3.990 <sup>***</sup> (0.556)
Random Effects Constant	0.153 <sup>***</sup> (0.048)	0.153 <sup>***</sup> (0.048)	0.157 <sup>***</sup> (0.05)	-0.940 <sup>***</sup> (0.159)
Residual Variance	0.483 <sup>***</sup> (0.005)	0.483 <sup>***</sup> (0.005)	0.482 <sup>***</sup> (0.005)	-0.364 <sup>***</sup> (0.005)
N2/ N1	20/16909	20/16909	20/16909	20/16909
LR Chi2	3627.43 <sup>***</sup>	3607.93 <sup>***</sup>	3630.31 <sup>***</sup>	3593.77 <sup>***</sup>

Standard errors in parentheses, \*  $p < .1$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

Table 2: Determinants of Negative Sentiments toward the Religious Other: Logistic Regression Estimations

	Model 5 Anti- Christian	Model 6 Anti-Christian (fixed Effects)	Model 7 Anti-Muslim	Model 8 Anti-Muslim (Fixed Effects)	Model 9 Anti-Jewish	Model 10 Anti-Jewish (Fixed Effects)
Religious Identity	0.658*** (0.075)	0.430*** (0.088)	0.262*** (0.067)	0.287*** (0.076)	0.582*** (0.060)	0.076 (0.082)
Religious and National Identity	0.530*** (0.097)	0.111 (0.118)	0.469*** (0.089)	0.316*** (0.096)	0.349*** (0.071)	-0.128 (0.092)
Globalization Index	-0.020*** (0.004)	0.074*** (0.010)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.074*** (0.014)	-0.028*** (0.003)	-0.165*** (0.019)
Percent Other Religion	-13.316*** (0.919)	-17.193*** (0.927)	2.773*** (0.441)	-32.009 (19.705)	-267.843*** (27.709)	-29.030 (17.838)
Religiosity	-0.071*** (0.023)	-0.001 (0.027)	-0.080*** (0.020)	-0.072*** (0.023)	0.082*** (0.017)	0.017 (0.025)
Other Religion Violent	0.990*** (0.210)	0.537** (0.212)	0.690*** (0.051)	0.847*** (0.055)	1.748*** (0.093)	0.530*** (0.128)
Belief in Cultural Superiority	0.179*** (0.040)	0.151*** (0.043)	0.257*** (0.027)	0.142*** (0.030)	0.276*** (0.028)	0.070** (0.034)
Satisfaction with Life	0.231*** (0.076)	0.192** (0.083)	0.173*** (0.062)	0.217*** (0.067)	-0.052 (0.063)	0.089 (0.079)
Socio-tropic Economic Expectations	0.128*** (0.039)	0.093** (0.043)	0.036 (0.033)	0.169*** (0.038)	0.093*** (0.033)	0.145*** (0.042)
Education	-0.286*** (0.086)	-0.375*** (0.091)	-0.240*** (0.058)	-0.252*** (0.062)	0.008 (0.059)	-0.188*** (0.072)
Middle Income	-0.169 (0.106)	-0.207* (0.107)	0.123* (0.068)	-0.006 (0.073)	0.286*** (0.073)	0.077 (0.088)
High Income	0.153 (0.111)	-0.097 (0.116)	0.079 (0.075)	0.018 (0.085)	0.677*** (0.076)	0.256** (0.100)
Female	-0.260*** (0.074)	-0.199** (0.079)	0.051 (0.051)	0.052 (0.054)	-0.195*** (0.051)	-0.155** (0.061)
Age	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
Employment Status	-0.200*** (0.075)	-0.126 (0.079)	-0.014 (0.054)	-0.064 (0.058)	0.072 (0.053)	-0.049 (0.065)
Constant	0.832** (0.364)	-3.291*** (0.671)	-0.752*** (0.262)	3.428*** (0.856)	0.910*** (0.245)	9.031*** (1.162)
Observations	8,268	8,268	10,946	10,946	13,538	13,538

Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1  
Fixed effects are available in the online appendix.

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